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OVER THE HILL TO THE POOR HOUSE-THE
FAILURE OF SECTION 522 BANKRUPTCY
EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1978
THOMAS J. REED*
What is the use of heapin' on me a pauper's shame?
Am I lazy or crazy? Am I blind or lame?
I am willin an' anxious an' ready any day
To work for a decent livin', an' pay my honest way
Will Carleton
The Bankruptcy Reform Act, in its original version, was considered the
answer for real and substantive reform of the bankruptcy system. One of the
salient reform measures was the comprehensive federal debtor's exemption
program, designed to give debtors in bankruptcy a welfare subsidy drawn
from assets otherwise available to their creditors for liquidation. The grand
design of this exemption program was reduced to a series of compromises'
that did not measure up to the constitutional standards for uniform bank-
ruptcy laws or proper delegations of legislative authority to the states.
Using a new federal exemption system, section 522 of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code 2 prescribes exemptions for debtors under chapters seven,
3
eleven 4 and thirteen. 5 These exemption rules make all of the debtor's prop-
erty part of his estate until held exempt. 6 If the debtor is eligible for these
exemptions, he can elect either the federal exemptions, or the federal non-
bankruptcy exemptions and state execution exemptions of the debtor's domi-
cile. 7 Given the extreme diversity of state exemption laws, Congress dele-
gated to each state the authority to restrict a debtor to the state's exemption
laws alone."
The theory behind allowing exemptions is to give individual wage earn-
* B.A. Marquette University (1962); J.D., Notre Dame Law School (1969); Professor of
Law at Delaware Law School, Widener University.
1. See infia text accompanying notes 153-208 (discussing the legislative history and com-
promises made in enacting the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982). The Federal exemptions are discussed in detail infia notes
188-210.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 701-766 (1982) (liquidation chapter).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1101-174 (1982) (reorganization chapter).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1301-1330 (1982) (adjustment of debts of an individual with regular in-
come chapter).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b), 541 (1981).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (1982).
8. This "opting out" clause reads: "Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individ-
ual debtor may exempt from property of the estate either-(1) property that is specified under
subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under para-
graph (2)(A) of this subsection speciftally does not so authorize; or ... " 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)
(emphasis added).
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ers or salaried persons who took bankruptcy relief a "fresh start" after receiv-
ing absolution from their debts. 9 First, the debtor would receive a discharge
preventing creditors from taking further action against the debtor. Second,
through various exemptions on certain assets, the debtor would receive the
basic necessities of life to begin his fresh start.'° These exemptions are, in the
abstract, a form of a welfare payment from the creditors.
Section 522 was an uneasy compromise between the House and the Sen-
ate I because of conflicting special interest group pressures. 12 Section 522
creates a series of problems for the courts to resolve. The opting out clause
provided to states in section 522(b)(1) permits states to pass a statute confin-
ing their citizens to state bankruptcy exemptions. This "opting out" clause
mandates non-uniform treatment of bankruptcy exemptions, because no na-
tionwide federal exemption statute would exist once one state determined to
"opt out." The United States Constitution requires Congress to pass "uni-
form Laws on the subject of bankruptcies."' 3 Consequently, state-drafted
exemption schemes have been attacked as unconstitutional, as has section
522(b) (1) authorizing such legislation.14
The experience with section 522 in bankruptcy courts and in federal
appellate courts has been chaos. Unresolved tension among bankruptcy
courts on the extent states can enact exemption levels different from the fed-
eral exemptions still exist. Some courts have held state exemptions unconsti-
tutional when they do not comply with the "fresh start" purpose of section
522.15 Other courts have held state exemption statutes constitutional. 1
6
To alleviate many of the problems with bankruptcy exemptions, the
whole scheme should be revised so that the bankruptcy system is more than
just providing indirect welfare payments to debtors. This article will begin
9. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6087-88 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. See id at 6087 (defining "fresh
start" as providing the debtor with the basic necessities of life after discharge in bankruptcy).
See also infra text accompanying notes 315-19 (discussing the theory behind bankruptcy
exemptions).
10. HousE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6087-88.
11. See In re Rhodes, 14 Bankr. 629, 633 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
12. Several people took part in the hearings on section 522 and addressed the exemption
problems. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on HR 31 & 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciagr, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (February 20,
1976) (statement of Robert Ward, Esq.) (allow state exemptions but remove any federal ceiling
on amount) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Hearings (March 8, 1976) (prepared statement of
American Life Insurance Association) (retain the 1898 Act exemptions). See also Hearings
(March 8, 1976) (statement of John Creedon, Senior Vice President of Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. and chairman of American Life Ins. Ass'n's Subcomm. on Fed. Bankruptcy Legis.) (retain
the 1898 Act exemptions).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
14. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 349 (1982); In re Kelley, 21 Bankr. 375 (M.D. Fla. 1982); In re
Parrish, 19 Bankr. 331 (D. Colo. 1982); In re Balgemann, 16 Bankr. 780 (N.D. I11. 1982); In re
Lausch, 16 Bankr. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Curry, 5 Bankr. 282 (N.D. Ohio 1980), a d, 11
Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
15. See, e.g., In re Balgemann, 16 Bankr. 780 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (states must protect the debt-
ors household goods). See also, In re Rhodes, 14 Bankr. 629 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (state exemption
unconstitutional because it discriminated between homeowners and nonhomeowners) rev'd sub
noma. Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983).
16. See e.g. In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 349 (1982).
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with a brief history of bankruptcy law pointing out its shortcomings and
improvements. The main aim of this article is to highlight the major techno-
logical and policy shortfalls of section 522 and to suggest a remedy for these
failings.
I. HISTORICAL BANKGROUND
A. English Insolvency Laws and Exemplions
The common law permitted creditors to use three writs to satisfy an
unpaid judgment: elegit-a writ allowing the creditor to take over the
debtor's land and reap the rents and profits until the judgment was liqui-
dated; levarifacias-which allowed the creditor to auction off the rents and
profits from the debtor's lands; and, fierifacias-which permitted the credi-
tor to obtain the aid of the sheriff to seize the debtor's personal property and
sell it to pay off the judgment. 17 A fourth writ, capias adsaisfaciendum, was
available to put a debtor in prison.18 After being clapped in prison, the
debtor had no way out unless his judgment was paid by relatives or friends.
Privy Council eventually intervened in these cases and forced the creditors of
an imprisoned debtor to agree to a composition and discharge the debtor.' 9
In 1670, the House of Lords passed an Act which authorized the courts
to accept these compositions and to release the debtors from prison retaining
their wearing apparel, bedding, and tools of the trade not exceeding £ 10.20
The Act also provided for a cash allowance to debtors based on a sliding
scale tailored to the size of the dividend paid to creditors.2 1 Consequently,
the American colonists from England brought with them insolvency laws for
poor debtors, bankruptcy laws for merchants and traders in financial dis-
tress, and debtor's exemptions from both processes.
17. Riesenfeld, Collection of Monel udgments in American Lau-A Historical Inventog and a Pro-
spectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155, 157 & note 9 (1957). See generally Riesenfeld, Enforcement of Mone
Judgments in Early American History, 71 MICH. L. REv. 691 (1973) (early American Colonies use of
these writs).
18. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 231 (1926). If a writ of capias ad
respondemdum could be issued in the action to compel the attendance of the debtor, a further writ
ofcaptas adsatsfacendum would issue on the signing of the judgment that ordered the debtor to
be jailed in lieu of the writs elegit, levarifacias orferifacias. Id
19. Id. at 233-34. As for dishonest debtors, Privy Council had no interest in assisting debt-
ors who had gotten themselves into financial trouble through fraud. This is illustrated by the
first English bankruptcy law passed during the reign of Henry VIII, which called for imprison-
ment of merchant traders who had fled to avoid paying debts or who had obtained credit under
false pretenses. 34 & 35 Hen. 8 ch. 4 (1542-43). The details of this law and other early English
laws are discussed fully in 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 236-40.
20. By taking an oath that his assets were not above £10 and that he had not made a
fraudulent conveyance of his assets, an innocent debtor could be discharged from custody so
long as his creditors were unwilling to pay his weekly expenses in debtors' prison. Debtors who
were laborers, however, were first sent to a two year stretch in the workhouse before being
released. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 235 (citing 22 & 23 Charles II ch. 20 (1670)).
21. By an act of 1705, if the bankrupt debtors cooperated with the commissioners in locat-
ing their assets and assisted them in the liquidation process, they were given a living allowance
from their assets and a small percentage of the estate upon distribution. See Glenn, Property
Exempt irom Creditors' Rights of Reahzation, 26 VA. L. REv. 127, 130 (1935).
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B. American Exempion Laws
The province of Pennsylvania re-enacted the English Act allowing com-
positions, retaining most of the same English exemption provisions.22 Other
colonies provided exemptions from execution and attachment, and exemp-
tions from distribution similar to the English provisions. 23 Following the
American Revolution and Shays' Rebellion, Massachusetts adopted a com-
prehensive insolvency law and a very forward-looking exemption law which
allowed a subsistance farmer or urban mechanic to salvage a considerable
nest egg from attachment, execution or the insolvency process. 24 Other
American states followed Massachusetts' lead.
2 5
Early American exemption statutes exempted some livestock, fodder,
and the farmer's or trader's tools from seizure.2 6 Sentimental objects such as
the family bible, church pew, and family portraits were also protected.
2 7
Because there were no federal insolvency or bankruptcy laws, these exemp-
tions laws were the only protection debtors had from their creditors' attacks
on their economic subsistence. In their time, these statutes did a fair job of
giving a poor debtor a "fresh start" after economic failure.
C. Federal Bankruptcy Exemptions
The Articles of Confederation did not provide for any continental insol-
vency laws. During the constitutional debates in 1787, the Convention in-
serted into the list of powers available to Congress the power to enact
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."'28 The constitutional con-
vention minutes on the insertion of this clause give little insight as to why it
was included in the Constitution. 29 The United States took no immediate
22. See 4 PA. STAT. ch. 315, p. 171 (1730).
23. See, COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA (1974) (discusses colonial ex-
emption laws).
24. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 100 § 1(1805) (current version at MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
235 § 34 (West Supp. 1983)).
25. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 907 (1902) (originally enacted in 1888, current version at
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-352b (West Supp. 1984)); ME. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 64 (1904)
(originally enacted in 1887, current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4421 (1983
Supp.); MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 286, § 27 (1947) (originally enacted in 1857, current version at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6023 (West 1968).
26. See supra notes 24-25.
27. See generally id
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 4.
29. On August 29, 1787, the convention moved to include in the full faith and credit clause
with the following proposition: "to establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies and
respecting the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange." C. WARREN, BANK-
RUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 4-5 (1935). See also 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489 (1937) (reprint of Madison's journal).
On examining the debate record, Prof. Nadelmann concluded the bankruptcy clause was
added to the full faith and credit clause due to problems anticipated by some of the convention-
eers in dealing with the enforcement of the judgments of one state in the courts of another.
Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankrupt Clause, I AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 216, 227 (1957).
On September 3, 1787, the bankruptcy clause was moved to roughly its present position in the
enumeration of congressional powers in article I. WARREN, supra, at 5; 2 FARRAND, supra, at
483 (reprint of Madison's journal).
Madison wrote:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected
with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or
[Vol. 61:4
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action to enact a bankruptcy law after ratification of the Constitution until
the depression caused by the Napoleonic Wars and caused by a number of
business failures in eastern mercantile cities at the end of the century.
3 0
1. The 1800 Bankruptcy Act
The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 allowed involuntary bankruptcy petitions
to be filed against merchant traders, if the petitioners proved the trader had
committed one or more acts of bankruptcy. 3' The 1800 Act empowered the
bankruptcy commissioners in federal courts to examine the bankrupt and his
wife on the nature and extent of their assets and debts. 3 2 The debtor re-
ceived an allowance from his own estate based on what the creditors received
similar to the sliding scale used in England. 33 No specific items of property
were listed as exempt. The act was repealed in 1803. 3 4 The next federal
bankruptcy act did not appear until after the panic of 1837, when President
Van Buren and later President Tyler pushed for bankruptcy legislation. 35
The new act became the Bankrupt Act of August 19, 1841,36 and was in-
tended to relieve insolvent debtors.
2. The 1841 Bankruptcy Act
The 1841 Bankruptcy Act was the first American bankruptcy act to
allow for specific items of property to be exempt from the bankruptcy pro-
cess. Like the 1800 Act, it provided for involuntary petitions against
merchants and traders, but it included an innovative section authorizing in-
their property may lie or be removed into different States that the expediency of it
seems not likely to be drawn into question.
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (J. Madison) (quoted in WARREN, supra, at 7).
Only one other pamphlet of the time carried any reference to the bankruptcy clause:
I am not sufficiently acquainted with the laws and internal policies of all the
states to discern fully how general bankrupt laws, made by the union, would effect
them or promote the public good. I believe the property of debtors, in the several
states, is held responsible for their debts in modes and forms very different. If uniform
bankrupt laws can be made without producing real and substantial inconveniences, I
wish them to be made by Congress.
LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER (R.H. Lee), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 306 (1968).
30. WARREN, supra note 29, at 12-13, 18-19. The bill was introduced shortly after the
collapse of several western land speculation schemes. Id at 12-13. It was passed when the war
with France began to take its toll on American vessels. Id at 18.
31. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19-21 (repealed Dec. 19, 1803, 2 Stat. 248).
The statute gave the federal district courts jurisdiction to hear bankruptcy matters, and, similar
to the English model, provided for appointment of bankruptcy commissioners. id. at 21-23.
32. Id at 25-28.
33. Id at 30-31. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. During its brief life, the 1800 Act was widely
condemned in Congress and in the press as oppressive to farmers and mechanics because a
merchant in a failing situation could obtain relief from his debts through an involuntary bank-
ruptcy action initiated by a friendly creditor, while no such relief was available to non-
merchants, who either paid their debts or went to debtor's prison. WARREN, supra note 29, at
19-21.
After the repeal of the 1800 Act several bankruptcy bills were introduced and defeated. See
generally WARREN, supra note 29, at 27-45.
35. WARREN, supra note 29, at 56, 69.
36. 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed Mar. 3, 1843, 5 Stat. 614).
1984]
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dividual debtors to file voluntary bankruptcy petitions. 37 Section three of
the 1841 Act directed the bankrupt to surrender all his property to the as-
signee in bankruptcy for sale, except:
necessary household and kitchen furniture, and such other articles
and necessaries of such bankrupt as the said assignee shall desig-
nate and set apart, having reference in the amount to the family,
condition, and circumstances of the bankrupt, but altogether not to
exceed in value, in any case, the sum of three hundred dollars; and,
also, the wearing apparel of such bankrupt, and that of his wife
and children; . . .38
The 1841 Act did not provide for a allowance of a percentage of the estate to
the debtor after payment of a dividend to creditors. It, too, was a stop-gap
measure. As soon as economic conditions brightened, the 1841 Act was re-
pealed in 1843. 3 9 In 1867, Congress passed a third Federal Bankruptcy Act,
to deal with the post-Civil War depression. 4°
3. The 1867 Bankruptcy Act
The 1867 Act allowed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy. Bankrupts
would recieve a discharge from all liability if the estate paid fifty cents-on-a-
dollar dividends.4 1 Under court supervision, a debtor could make an ar-
rangement with his creditors and execute a deed of trust to a trustee on all
non-exempt assets for benefit of the creditors,42 in lieu of voluntary or invol-
untary bankruptcy. Section fourteen of the act contained a provision similar
to section three of the 1841 Act exempting certain property from creditors.
4 3
In contrast to the 1841 Act exemptions, however, the 1867 Act allowed every
insolvent debtor a federal exemption floor plus any state exemptions to
which the debtor would have been entitled under state execution laws. This
was a compromise made to get the bill passed.'
4. The 1898 Bankruptcy Act
The 1867 Bankruptcy Act was repealed in 1878. 4 1 Twenty years later,
following the crash of 1893, Congress passed a new, comprehensive and per-
manent bankruptcy act. The 1898 Act contained a special section dealing
with exemption rights:
[The Bankruptcy Act] shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts
of the exemptions which are prescribed by the State laws in force at
the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have
37. Id at 442.
38. Id at 443.
39. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. Set WARREN, supra note 29, at 85. The act was
criticized by pro-debtor interests as unjust because the mandatory federal exemptions deprived
debtors of more generous state exemptions. WARREN supra note 29, at 82 (citing speech by Rep.
James A. McDougall given January 5, 1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess.)
40. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (amended at 15 Stat. 227) (containing
federal exemptions similar to the 1841 Act) (repealed, 20 Stat. 99 (1878)).
41. 15 Stat. at 228 (as amended).
42. 14 Stat. at 538 (required a majority of the creditors to consent).
43. Id. at 522-23, and as changed in 15 Stat. at 228. See supra text accompanying note 38.
44. WARREN, supra note 29, at 103.
45. WARREN, supra note 29, at 122. See Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 168, 20 Stat. 99.
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had their domicile for the six months or the greater portion thereof
immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
46
Besides the recognition of state exemptions, the 1898 Act also provided for
voluntary petitions in bankruptcy.4 7 The 1898 Act defined the bankrupt's
estate so as to exclude any exempt property.48 The only duty the trustee had
with respect to a debtor's exempt property was to set it aside upon the
debtor's filing of an exemption claim. 49 A 1938 amendment to section six
added "federal exemptions" to "state exemptions." 50 This scheme governed
all individual bankruptcies filed from 1899 to 1978.
D. State Exemption Laws
By the time the 1898 Bankruptcy Act was adopted, a number of state
exemption laws contained exemptions not found under the old colonial ex-
emption programs. These exemptions were the homestead exemption for the
debtor's personal residence,5 ' the life insurance policy exemption, 52 and the
wage exemptions from garnishment and attachment.
53
1. The Homestead Exemption
Texas led the states by incorporating into its' constitution a homestead
exemption which guaranteed to all heads of families residing in Texas "two
hundred acres of land, . . . or any town or city lot or lots, in value not to
exceed $2,000." 5 4 By the end of the 1860's most states had some form of a
homestead exemption. Typically, if the debtor was the head of a family, the
homestead exemption exempted the debtor's personal residence from seizure
on attachment or execution.
55
Some states today require that the head of the family execute and ac-
knowledge a declaration of homestead to secure the exemption. This decla-
ration would operate prospectively against future creditors, but would not
bar creditors' claims which predated the declaration.5 6 Although other
states do not require a declaration, they also hold once the homestead is
acquired the exemption protects only prospectively. 5 7 The homestead ex-
46. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548.
47. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4, 30 Stat. 544, 547.
48. The trustee shall "be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, except
insofar as it is to property which is exempt. ... Id at 565.
49. Id. §47a(1l), 30 Stat. at 557.
50. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 6 52 Stat. 840, 847.
51. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 298, §§ 15-16 (1857).
52. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 183, § 11 (1885).
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, §§ 4-5 (1878).
54. TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. VII, § 22 (current version at TEX. CONST. art. 16, §§ 50-51).
See aLro GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 5218; FLA. GEN. STAT. ANN. div. 4, tit. 1, ch. 6, § 2520
(1906); MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, ch. 267, § 7721 (Howell 1882) (originally enacted in 1848);
MISS. CODE ANN. ch. 48, §§ 2146-47 (1906); WiS. REV. STAT. ch. 134, § 23 (1858).
55. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 804 (1974).
56. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.01 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2302 (1983);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-4 (Supp. 1983). These same states permit the declaration to have a
retroactive effect if it is made shortly before the sale on execution.
57. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 427.060 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, § I
(West Supp. 1983) Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.510 (Vernon 1952); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 107
(1975); W. VA. CODE § 38-9-3 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
19841
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emption is usually limited by a dollar amount which is intended to be a sum
sufficient to cover the mortgagor's equity in an ordinary personal residence
or family farm. 58
Under the 1898 Act, the homestead exemption created serious problems
for bankruptcy courts. One such problem was the effectiveness of a home-
stead declaration filed after the bankrupt had subjected his assets to the ju-
risdiction of the bankruptcy court. Under the "strong arm" clause of the
1898 Act,59 a bankruptcy trustee had the power of a levying creditor as
against the debtor's assets at the time of the bankruptcy filing.6° Without
relying on the strong arm clause, the Supreme Court in White v. Stump 6 held
that a trustee could upset a homestead declaration filed after a voluntary
bankruptcy adjudication. 62  Twenty years later, in Myers v. Matly,6 3 the
Supreme Court modified White v. Stump. Myers holds that a homestead ex-
emption filed after the levy but before the sale will not be destroyed by the
trustee if the state law provides such a declaration is effective against a credi-
tor.64 The Supreme Court failed to reconcile the Myers decision with the
earlier decision in White v. Stump up to the adoption of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code.65 Myers, in effect, breaches the cut off point found to exist in White v.
Stump, and reliance on the strong arm clause is misplaced, 66 leaving consid-
erable doubt surrounding the trustee's legal position against inchoate home-
stead exemptions.
2. The Life Insurance Exemption
New York's Verplanck Act of 184067 exempted from seizure by the hus-
band's creditors life insurance contracts purchased by a married woman on
her husband's life, up to an annual premium of $300.68 Massachusetts fol-
lowed suit by exempting life insurance from all claims of the named in-
sured's creditors, not only for married women but for all classes of
beneficiaries.6 9 In 1861, Massachusetts further exempted from attachment
or execution the cash surrender value of life insurance policies.70 By the end
of the nineteenth century, many states had passed laws exempting life insur-
58. Vukowich, supra note 55, at 800 (in over half the states the exemption is $5,000 or less).
As of June 1982, the average of all thirty-nine jurisdictions using a dollar limit on the homestead
exemption was $14,296.67.
59. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70c, 52 Stat. 840, 880 (1938) (amendment to the 1898
Act).
60. Id.
61. 266 U.S. 310 (1924) (decided before section 70 was amended).
62. The decision rested on the Court determining the bankruptcy filing date was the point
of time which property not exempted left the debtor's hands. Id. at 313.
63. 318 U.S. 622 (1943).
64. Id at 627-28. Applied in Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.), rev'g on rehearing,
189 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
65. See Countryman, For A New Exeniptin Polic in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 678,
690-95 (1960).
66. See generally, id at 693-95.
67. Verplank Act of 1840, NEW YORK LAWS ch. 80.
68. Id See Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United States, 4 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 583, 589 (1957).
69. MASS. LAWS ch. 82 (1844).
70. 1861 Mass. Acts ch. 186.
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ance proceeds and the cash surrender value of insurance policies from
seizure.7' There is no uniformity among the states on the amount of life
insurance exempted or who can be a beneficiary. 72 Because life insurance
represents investment as well as protection, this has led one scholar to argue
that the life insurance exemption should be limited to a reasonable dollar
amount and apply only to dependent beneficiaries.
73
3. Wage Exemption
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, states exempted an individ-
ual's wages from attachment or garnishment in whole or in part. 74 The state
wage exemption statutes were not uniform. Many of the states excluded a
stated amount of weekly wages from attachment or garnishment.
75
Through decisional law some states have also exempted wages after they are
deposited in the debtor's bank account. 76 When the 1898 Act was enacted,
the amount of wages exempted by the various states was not particularly
generous. 77 Because future wages did not become a part of the bankrupt's
estate in "straight" bankruptcy under the 1898 Act, this exemption meant
little to the bankruptcy process, except as to debts not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
78
Besides the basic wage exemptions, other types of payments were classi-
fied either as exempt or not exempt prior to the 1978 Act. Future earnings
not yet received by the debtor could become part of his bankruptcy estate if
the future earnings accrued prior to the date of bankruptcy and were paid in
71. S. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS REMEDIES AND DEBTOR'S
PROTECTION 332-36 (3d ed. 1979). See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 807.
72. Vukowich, supra note 55, at 808-10. There are basically three methods for limiting the
amount exempted: 1) no dollar limitation; 2) a face amount limitation; or, 3) a dollar ceiling on
the annual premium. See id. at 808.
73. Id. at 811-13.
74. See TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 28; ALA. CODE § 2823 (1876) (current version at § 6-10-7
(1975); D.C. Acts ofJune 19, 1878, ch. 321, 20 stat. 173 (current version at D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 15-503 (1981); FLA. LAWS ch. 2065, § 1 (1875) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.11
(1977)); 1861 ILL. LAWS p. 177, § 2 (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-803
(Smith-Hurd 1983)); 1886 KAN. SESS. LAWS ch. 11, § 1 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-2310(b) (1983)); 1858 MINN. PUB. STAT. ch. 61, §§ 90-91 (current version at MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 550.37(13) (West Supp. 1983)); 1897 N.M. LAws tit. 13, ch. 1, § 1737 (current version at
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 35-12-7 (1978)); 1893 OKLA. STAT. § 4383-84 (current version at OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 5.105(2) (1983)); 1896 TENN. PUB. ACTS ch. 4, art. I, § 3794 (current
version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-106 (1955)); 1893 WASH. LAWS p. 102, ch. 56, § 23 (current
version at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.33.280 (1984 Supp.)). See also Vukowich, supra note 55,
at 813-20 (discussing the treatment of wage exemptions).
75. See, e.g., 1861 ILL. LAWS p. 177 § 2 (up to $25.00); 1858 MINN. PUB. STAT. ch. 61 §6 90-
91 (up to $25.00).
76. See Miller v. Monrean, 507 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1973) (seaman's wages), Rutter v. Shum-
way, 16 Colo. 95, 26 P. 321 (1891); Staton v. Vernon, 209 Iowa 1123, 229 N.W. 763 (1930);
Colonial Discount Co. v. Wilhelm, 40 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1943). But see Holmes v. Blazer Financial
Servs., 369 So. 2d 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that exempt wages lose their character
when deposited in a bank account); John 0. Melby & Co. Bank v. Anderson, 88 Wis. 2d 252,
276 N.W.2d 274 (1979) (in considering the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, held that
the exempt wages lose their character when deposited in a bank account).
77. See supra notes 74-75. The exempt amounts ranged from $25-30.00 under the original
wage exemption acts, rather than by percentage of wages often used today. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 6-10-7 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-803 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
78. See 6nfta text accompanying notes 106-07, 114-18.
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the form of income tax refunds.79 Accrued vacation pay, on the other hand,
was exempted from the bankruptcy estate as post-bankruptcy "fresh start"
assets.8 0 Retirement plans and pension annuities were also exempt from the
bankruptcy estate in several states.8 1 Alimony and child support payments
to persons who filed bankruptcy petitions were generally not exempt under
state execution and attachment laws.
8 2
The treatment of wage-based benefits, such as retirement benefits, pen-
sion plan payments, and periodic support payments for alimony and child
support, by state legislatures has not been consistent. For example, life in-
surance policies that are settled under an annuity settlement option are ex-
empt, but a comparable payment to a survivor out of a qualified pension
plan is not.8 3 Not all states specifically exempt worker's compensation pay-
ments and unemployment compensation benefits from seizure or attach-
ment;8 4 nor, do all states protect the insurance industry from attachment of
health insurance or disability insurance payments;85 and, only one-fourth of
the states exempt welfare payments from execution and attachment.8 6 The
1898 Act did little to combat these inconsistencies. Section six of the 1898
Act did not preclude a debtor from claiming his state wage exemptions.
8 7
At the same time nothing in the chapter thirteen amendment to the 1898
Act on wage exemption plans took in account the state exemptions as a limit
79. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
80. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1971).
81. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 821-24 (discussing state exemptions for retirement
funds and similar "fringe benefits").
82. Vukowich, supra note 55, at 824-25. Alaska exempts the amount of a divorced man's
wages necessary to make child support payments. ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.085 (1973). New York
exempts support payments from the creditors of the wife and children. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW
§ 5205(e)(3) (McKinney 1977).
83. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 822-23.
84. Vukowich, supra note 55, at 826.
The states exempting workers compensation benefits are: ALA. CODE § 25-5-86(b) (1975);
ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1068(B) (1978); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 704.160 (West Supp.
1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31.320 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-17
(Burns 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-514 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.821 (West
Supp. 1983).
The states exempting unemployment compensation are: ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.405(b)
(1962 & Supp. 1972); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 704.120 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 8-80-103 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.051 (West Supp. 1983-84); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN., ch.
48, § 540 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.17(2) (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-9-18(c) (1960); N.Y. LABOR LAWS § 595(2) (MeKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-17(c)
(Repl. Vol. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.32 (Page Supp. 1983-84); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 2-303 (Supp. 1980).
85. For the states that do provide such exemptions see CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 704.130
(West Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.18 (1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 511.37 (1949); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit 24A, § 2429 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 100A (West Supp.
1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.39 (1947); TEX. INS. CODE art 21.22(1) (1981); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 48.18.400 (1961).
86. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11002 (West 1980 & Supp. 1984); LA. REV.
STAT. § 46.111 (West 1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 400.62 (West 1976); OH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5107.12 (1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 46-208 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. § 239.13 (1969); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 27-2-21 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A.36 (Supp. 1983); R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-6-
14 (1956); S.C. Code Ann. § 43-5-190 (Supp. 1983). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-2-131
(1973) (payments to the blind exempted); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167:25 (1977) (payments to
the blind, old age assistance, and disabled aid exempted); ORE. REV. STAT. § 412.115 (1981).
87. 30 Stat. at 548. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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on what the debtor contributed to his plan.88
4. The Spendthrift Trust, a Hidden Exemption
A spendthrift trust is not an exemption, but when spendthrift trusts be-
came popular in the late nineteenth century, state courts consistently refused
to enforce attachment, execution, or proceedings supplemental to execution
against the trustee for debts contracted by the beneficiary. 89 Although the
spendthrift trust was not included in state-created exemption statutes, judi-
cial enforcement of the spendthrift trust's forfeiture restraints on alienation
of income and principal made such trusts practically exempt.90 Most bank-
ruptcy courts followed state decisional law and held that spendthrift trust
funds were not part of the bankrupt's estate under section 70(a) of the 1898
Act.9 ' Because of the variations in state laws, treatment of a spendthrift
trust as an exemption was not resolved by the courts under the 1898 Bank-
ruptcy Act.
E. The 1898 Act and Federal Non-bankmplcy Exemptions
The federal, non-bankruptcy law exemptions which could be elected in
place of state exemptions did provide for many of the exemptions that states
provided. The federal exemptions included federal employee wages, mili-
tary disability payments and others. 92 But because section six of the 1898
Act allowed the federal exemptions to yield to the elected state exemptions,
the federal exemptions did little to make the 1898 Act a uniform act.
93
88. See Chandler Act ch. 575, §§ 601-86, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (amendment to the 1898 Act).
89. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 790-92. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 149 comment a (1959).
90. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 790-92, pointing out the differences between a spend-
thrift trust and an exemption.
91. Eaton v. Boston Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916); Danning v. Lederer, 232 F.2d 610 (7th
Cir. 1956); Roundtree v. Lane, 155 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1946); Suskin & Berry v. Rumley, 37 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1930); Jones v. Harrison, 7 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 652
(1926); Allen v. Tate, 6 F.2d 139 8th Cir. 1925). See also In re Morris, 204 F. 770 (2d Cir. 1913)
(allowing New York bankruptcy trustees to recover against trust assets). Illinois immunizes any
trust fund set up for a beneficiary from execution or attachment. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 22, § 49
(Smith-Hurd 1958);see Hummel v. Cardwell, 390 Ill. 526, 62 N.E.2d 433 (1945),cert. denied, 327
U.S. 793 (1946).
92. See Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV.
769, 787, 791 (1980).
93. Id at 773. "[T]here is no one thing which makes our uniform Bankruptcy Act more
un-uniform than Section 6. . . which recognizes state laws in the setting aside of exemptions."
Id., quoting King, Proposed Amendments to the Chandler Act, 45 CoM. L.J. 36, 40 (1940). But when
considering the 1867 Act, one senator commented:
The idea of some gentlemen is that the law, to be uniform, must be equal in its
operations. I do not hold to that idea at all. If we make a rule which operates upon
the States equally, that is to say, which is equal in its terms, so far as the States are
concerned, it would not be unconstitutional simply because, owing to the particular
provisions of the several States, the operation would not be precisely similar. The
provision of the Constitution unquestionably was intended to apply to the several
States to prevent any distinction being made between them.
WARREN, supra note 32, at 106-07.
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II. THE FLAWS OF SECTION SIX OF THE 1898 BANKRUPTCY ACT
A. The Evils of Non-Uniform Bankruptcy Exemptions
Section 6 of the 1898 Act 9 4 condoned a different federal exemption law
for each state or territory within the United States. Under the 1898 Act
election provision a Delaware debtor in bankruptcy court was able to hold
back only $200 worth of personal property and wearing apparel, $75 worth
of tools of the trade or business, a sewing machine and a rented player pi-
ano.9 5 The same individual, had he been residing in Texas at the time of his
financial misfortune could have saved a 160 acre tract of land or a half acre
town lot from bankruptcy process, regardless of the worth of the property
attributable to improvements.9 6 More importantly, within the same state
different classes of creditors, presumably operating under the same federal
exemption rule, could be treated differently in bankruptcy process. In Mas-
sachusetts, for example, a debtor could take advantage of the liberal home-
stead allowance by filing a recorded declaration of homestead.9 7 This
declaration did not affect creditors holding debts predating the declara-
tion.9 8 When the debtor holding the homestead exemption filed his bank-
ruptcy petition, some creditors could later seek satisfaction against the
homestead property if their debts predated the homestead declaration,9 9 al-
though their debts were supposedly dischargeable in bankruptcy.
In most states, mechanic lien holders and material lien holders had spe-
cial status against exempt homesteads. Labor and material furnished to im-
prove a homestead were not frustrated by the exempt nature of the
homestead property, and could be foreclosed under state law. °° Such credi-
tors were voluntary creditors of the bankrupt and their claims would other-
wise be subject to discharge in bankruptcy. Nonetheless, mechanic lien
holders were allowed to foreclose against exempt homestead property even
though the owner of the homestead had received a discharge in bank-
ruptcy,10 ' on logic similar to that of the creditor holding a debt preceding
the creation of the homestead. Consequently, the 1898 Act federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions worked arbitrarily and capriciously in individual cases.
Section six provided no particular incentive for debtors 
to file bankruptcy'
petitions to receive better treatment than they would have had by a general
grab of their assets by creditors in state courts.
10 2
94. 30 Stat. at 548.
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4902-03 (1975).
96. TEX. [PROP.] CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (prior to amendment); set also
TEX. CONST. art. 16, §§ 50, 51 (200 acres for family outside city, 100 acres for a single person;
up to $10,000 for a lot in the city).
97. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188 § 2 (West 1977).
98. Id. at § 1 (amended 1979).
99. Id. at §§ 1-2.
100. ALA. CONST. art. 10, § 207 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-1 (Supp. 1983); MD. [CTs.
& JUD. PROC.] CODE ANN. § 11-507 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-103 (1978); TEX. [PROP.]
CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2740 (1973).
101. Ste supra note 99.
102. See Kennedy, Limiations of Exemptzons in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REV. 445, 450-53
(1960). Kennedy argues against a set of specific federal exemptions because such a provision
would encourage creditors to file involuntary petitions against debtors in states which had ex-
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Serious doubts about the constitutionality of such a crazy-quilt system
of exemptions were often raised. Within a few years after Congress passed
the 1898 act, creditors decided to challenge its constitutionality under the
bankruptcy clause of the Constitution.10 3  In Hanover National Bank v.
Moyses, 104 Hanover National Bank sued defendant Moyses on a money judg-
ment entered against Moyses in Mississippi on a promissory note in de-
fault. 10 5 Subsequently, Moyses moved to Tennessee and filed a voluntary
bankruptcy petition under the 1898 Act.' 0 6 Moyses received a discharge in
bankruptcy from all of his debts. 10 7 The Supreme Court considered the
Bank's constitutional argument that Moyses' discharge should be void be-
cause enforcing state exemptions under the 1898 Act' 0 8 violated the uni-
formity requirement of the bankruptcy clause.
In affirming the circuit court's finding for Moyses, the Supreme Court
noted that Congress, unlike the states, was not forbidden to pass statutes
impairing contracts.' 0 9 The only limitation imposed was that "[tihe laws
passed on the subject must, however, be uniform throughout the United
States, but that uniformity is geographical and not personal, . . .""o Then,
without addressing the differences between the exemption scheme of the
1867 Act and that of the 1898 Act,' the Supreme Court adopted the point
of view expressed in lower court cases decided under the much different 1867
exemption laws. That view was that the 1898 Act, requiring all federal
courts sitting in bankruptcy to use state exemption laws as a rule of decision,
did not violate the constitutional requirement of uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies.' 12 Justice Fuller claimed uniformity was met because the
trustee "takes in each State whatever would have been available to the credi-
tors if the bankrupt law had not been passed."' 13 The Supreme Court con-
cluded, without stating its reasons, that Congress had made no unlawful
emptions less generous than the federal exemptions. Cf England v. Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641,
643-44 (9th Cir. 1956) (creditors should not be subject to a haphazard "grab law").
103. The bankruptcy clause of the constitution provides "to establish . . . uniform laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
104. 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
105. Id. at 181-82.
106. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ch. 541, § 4, 30 Stat. 544, 547.
107. 186 U.S. at 182. Claiming no notice of Moyses' voluntary bankruptcy petition, Hano-
ver National Bank continued to prosecute the judgment action against Moyses until Moyses
demurred. Id at 183. The demurrer was sustained by the circuit court. Id
108. See supra text accompanying note 46.
109. See 186 U.S. at 187-88. In support of this argument, Justice Fuller noted that the 1867
Act applied to persons other than merchants and traders without infringing on the "uniform
system of bankruptcy." Id at 187. Set also In re Klein, appended to Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. (I
How.) 265, 277 (1843) (quoted in Moyses, 186 U.S. at 186). Congressional jurisdiction in bank-
ruptcy extends "to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the property of the debtor
among his creditors; this is its least limit. Its greatest, is the discharge of a debtor from his
contracts." Id. at 281.
110. 186 U.S. at 188.
111. Under section 14 of the 1867 Act debtors were allowed to claim state-created home-
stead exemptions over and above the federal "floor" exemptions. See In re Deckert, 7 F. Cas. 334
(E.D. Va. 1874) (No. 3728) (quoted in Moyses 186 U.S. at 189-90). Such an "over and above"
claim was not allowed under the 1898 Act. Therefore the question of uniformity should have
been treated differently in Moyses.
112. See supra text accompanying note 109, 186 U.S. at 188.
113. 186 U.S. at 190.
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delegation of legislative power to state assemblies by means of section 6."4
In effect, Moyses validates as constitutional the non-uniform treatment of a
treatment of a bankrupt's federal bankruptcy exemptions from state to state.
This allows the accident of domicile to control a federal rule.
A few years later, in Lockwood v. Exchange Bank,' 1 5 the Supreme Court
approved the non-uniform treatment by states of different classes of creditors
as constitutionally permissible under the bankruptcy clause. The issue in
Lockwood was whether a bankruptcy court had any jurisdiction over the
bankrupt's exempt property to enforce the rights of a creditor holding an
exemption waiver against the property.' l 6 After Lockwood was adjudged
bankrupt," l 7 Exchange Bank objected to the trustee's designation of the
homestead and other property as exempt." I" Exchange Bank claimed Lock-
wood had waived his exemption rights in their favor." '9 To meet Exchange
Bank's potential levy on Lockwood's exempt property, the district court en-
forced Lockwood's waiver by reducing Lockwood's exemptions to the lowest
permissible amount. 120 The Supreme Court concluded that Congress did
not give the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to enforce an exemption waiver
held by a creditor against the bankrupt's exempt property.
We think that the terms of the bankruptcy act of 1898. . . clearly
evidence the intention of Congress that the title to the property of a
bankrupt generally exempted by state laws should remain in the
bankrupt and not pass to his representative in bankruptcy, as did
the provisions of the act of 1867, . . . .121
A contrary holding would have allowed the bankruptcy court to assume
jurisdiction over exempt property, which in the Supreme Court's eyes would
cause an "irremediable" inconvenience to the bankrupt and to other parties
interested in an orderly liquidation in favor of the waiver-holding credi-
tors. 12 2 Therefore, the Supreme Court compromised: although the bank-
ruptcy court had no jurisdiction over the bankrupt's exempt assets, the
waiver holding creditor could require a stay of all bankruptcy proceedings
while it perfected its levy and execution rights against otherwise exempt
property. 
23
114. Id, ctitng In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 560 (1891). In re Rahrer concerned state's police
power and interstate commerce. Charles Rahrer, without a druggist permit, had sold alcohol
shipped from Missouri in defiance of the Kansas prohibition act. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 546-
47. The Supreme Court held Congress' authorization for states to regulate internal sales of
alcoholic beverages was not an improper delegation of Congress' authority to regulate com-
merce. See id. at 561-62.
115. 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
116. Id at 298.
117. Id at 296 (Lockwood had filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition).
118. Id at 294-95.
119. Id.
120. Id at 296. In allowing exemption waivers Georgia provided a minimum exemption of
wearing apparel and household and kitchen furniture, and provisions for not more than three
hundred dollars. See id at 297 (citing GA. CONST. of 1877, art. 9, § 3).
121. Id at 299.
122. Id at 300.
123. Id. at 300-01.
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The Lockwood holding is inconsistent.' 2 4  First, the Supreme Court
stated that the bankruptcy courts had no jurisdiction over the debtor's ex-
empt assets,' 2 5 and as such can not adjudicate a claim by an exemption
waiver-holding creditor against exempt assets. Yet, it directed the bank-
ruptcy court to stay its hand while the waiver-holding creditor sought relief
in state court against the exempt assets. 126 This gave the bankruptcy court
jurisdiction to suspend its operations until some preferred creditor realized
collection against exempt assets. In fact, the Supreme Court conceded the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the exempt assets of the bankrupt. 1
2 7
Thus, no creditor or bankrupt could force an approval of a trustee's report
on exempt property so long as a single waiver-holding creditor required time
to perfect a judgment or execution lien against exempt assets. Non-uniform
treatment of exemptions proper 28 and non-uniform treatment of creditors
were condoned under the 1898 Act 129 despite the bankruptcy clause in the
Constitution.
B. The Question of a Debtor's Domicile
Because the 1898 Bankruptcy Act allowed debtors to claim the exemp-
tions offered by their state of domicile, the federal bankruptcy courts were
plunged into the application of state conflict of laws rules relating to the
enforcement of judgments and the applicability of exemptions. The
Supreme Court, in dicta in Chicago, Rock Island & Paciic Railway v. Stum,'
130
stated that state exemption laws are not constituent parts of the contract to
pay a debt, but should be considered remedies.' 3 ' Thus, it followed that
when an out-of-state debtor was sued by an in-state creditor on a contract to
pay money, and execution was taken in the forum state, the exemption laws
of the forum state would prevail.' 32 Transferring this reasoning to bank-
124. See generally Kennedy, supra note 101, at 462 (the Lockwood decision has been the subject
of much disharmony).
125. See 190 U.S. at 299.
126. See id at 300-01.
The doctrine affords a mode of circumventing the policy and provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act which condemn preferences and secret liens. When a waiver holder is
permitted to prove the full amount of his claim in bankruptcy and to receive dividends
computed thereon and at the same time to enjoy the blessing of the bankruptcy court
while he pursues the debtor's exempt property elsewhere, he is surely getting preferen-
tial treatment in any ordinary sense of that term.
Kennedy, supra note 101, at 463 (footnotes omitted).
127. See id. at 298 (quoting bankruptcy act provisions dealing with exempt property).
128. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
129. Se supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
130. 174 U.S. 710 (1899).
131. "Exemption laws are not a part of the contract; they are part of the remedy and subject
to the law of the forum." Id at 717 (citations omitted). Sturm was an action between Iowa and
Kansas domicilaries on an enforcement of a garnishment judgment. Cf Currie & Schreter,
Unconstituttonal Discrinmmatiin n the Conflict of Laws. Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1, 25-26
(1960) (criticizing the Supreme Court for considering the conflict of law issue when it was not
necessary to the case).
132. This position was later ratified in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 132 (1971):
The local law of the forum determines what property of a debtor within the state is
exempt from execution unless another state, by reason of such circumstances as the
domicile of the creditor and the debtor within its territory, has the dominant interest
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ruptcy practice, this would authorize a debtor to claim exemptions provided
for by the forum state in which he filed his bankruptcy petition. But, the
federal courts reach a contrary conclusion.
Resting in part on the domiciliary provisions of section 2 in the 1898
Act concerning bankruptcy jurisdiction and the express provisions of section
6, the federal courts held a bankrupt could claim the exemptions of his dom-
iciliary state. 133 These exemptions would apply even if part of the bank-
rupt's property was situated in another state that had different exemption
laws applicable to that state's residents. 134 Consequently, property which
would qualify as exempt in the forum state, but not the domicile state,
would not be exempt in bankruptcy. 135 Since residency and domicile are not
equivalent terms, 136 under the 1898 Act a bankrupt could wind up losing
exemptions guaranteed to a resident when the bankruptcy court found that
the debtor was domiciled in a place other than his residence. Such predica-
ments were inherent in the federal exemption system in the 1898 Act because
the Act depended upon state rules of decision for its operation.
C. Critical Reactions to the Section Six Exemption Scheme
Until the 1960's, section 6137 was the subject of very little criticism.
When the critical commentaries began to mushroom, one of the first com-
mentators, Professor Countryman, immediately pointed out that the federal
bankruptcy exemption policy lacked uniformity because it depended on the
individual states' execution exemptions to protect the federal interest. 138
State exemption laws are not designed primarily for use in a
system of orderly liquidation where all of the debtor's estate is to be
converted to cash, but in a system of piecemeal liquidation where
each creditor levies upon and sells such property as he can locate
• . . The problem for the bankruptcy court is usually that of iden-
tifying property other than cash which fits the description con-
tained in the state exemption law-and of appraising that property
where the state law fixes a value limit. 1
39
Professor Countryman's solution to have uniformity without using fifty dif-
ferent state exemption laws was to pass a nationwide uniform exemption act
in the question of exemption. In that event, the local law of the other state will be
applied.
See Currie & Schreter, supra note 130, at 28 (supporting this position because it prevents forum
shopping by an in-state creditor).
133. See e.g. In re Camp, 17 Am. BR. (N.S.) 189 (S.D. Cal. 1931).
134. See in re Reiter, 58 F.2d 631, 21 Am. BR. (N.S.) 290 (2d Cir. 1932),cert. denied, 287 U.S.
652 (1933) (law of the bankrupt's domicile controlled regarding exemption of life insurance
contract even though the policy was located in New York). See also In re Camp, 17 Am. B.R.
(N.S.) 189 (S.D. Cal. 1931) (Texas homestead exemption applied to Texas property because the
bankrupt had not established California as his new domicile).
135. See In re Stevens, 23 F. Cas. I (W.D. Wis. 1870) (No. 13,392) (applying section 14 of the
1867 Act).
136. See generaly Reese & Green, That Eluszwe Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1953)
(discussing the differences and similarities between the-use of residence and domicile).
137. See supra text accompanying note 46.
138. See Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RuTGERs L. REV. 678,
680-84 (1960).
139. Id at 681 (footnotes omitted).
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that would only provide for a cash allowance to bankrupts from their es-
tates.' 4 ° Such a cash allowance would be similar to the provisions of the
1800 and 1841 bankruptcy acts.'
4'
Another commentator advocated no change in the use of state exemp-
tion laws in federal bankruptcy cases. 14 2 This commentator recognized, as
did Professor Countryman, 143 that state exemption laws were passed in a
pre-industrial era for the benefit of self-sufficient subsistence farmers and
small town tradesmen, and no longer met the exemption needs of a post-
industrial highly interdependent society.' 4 4 Even though the state exemp-
tions may be ill-adapted to serve their original purpose, the recognition of
state interests in protecting bankrupts from poverty and a dependence on
public assistance should continue.145
Both commentators neglected to consider some of the "hidden exemp-
tions" of the 1898 Act. For example, real or personal property held by ten-
ancy in the entirety was not part of one tenant's bankrupt estate under
section 70(a) unless both tenants filed petitions and the two petitions were
consolidated for disposition. 146  Countryman did note, however, that
"spendthrift trusts" were not included in the bankrupt's estate, and practi-
cally speaking, were treated as exempt.147 Although future earnings were
not exempt, unless they qualified under one of the federal exemption statutes
for wages or other benefits, the discharge of the debtor in bankruptcy
stopped creditors not holding a reaffirmation agreement from attaching or
garnishing the bankrupt's future earnings.'
48
Other critical reviews of the state of the bankruptcy law also included
attacks on the exemption program of section 6,149 along with articles directly
attacking section 6.150 Nearly all the criticism concerning section 6 was di-
rected at the use of antique state exemption laws in a modern commercial
setting as the means for preserving the economic viability of bankrupt debt-
140. Id. at 746-48.
141. See supra notes 33-34, 38 and accompanying text.
142. Kennedy, supra note 101, at 445-46. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
143. See Countryman, supra note 137, at 681-84.
144. Kennedy, supra note 101, at 446-49.
145. Id. If the state exemptions are liberal then creditors should take that into account when
dealing with debtors. Id. at 450.
146. See generally IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 6.06 (14th ed. 1974).
147. Countryman, supra note 137, at 669-70. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
148. Under the 1898 Act, a reaffirmation of a debt discharged in bankruptcy was a matter
between the bankrupt and his creditors and was supported by an oral promise to pay the debt,
disregarding the statute of frauds. Later the Supreme Court ruled, however, that a pre-bank-
ruptcy wage attachment could not continue after the debtor's discharge, even if the wage at-
tachment was neither a fraudulent transfer nor a preference. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234 (1934). Section 524(c) and (d) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act severely restricts
the debtor's reaffirmation of a debt discharged in bankruptcy and has pre-empted the old com-
mon-law rules surrounding reaffirmation. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c)-(d) (1982).
149. See, e.g., D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 81-84
(197 1); Countryman, Consumer Bankrupt -- Some Recent Changes and Some Proposals, 19 U. KAN. L.
REV. 165, 167-68 (1971).
150. See Note: Bankruptcy Exemptions: Cntique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459 (1959); See




ors.1 5 1 When the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws was established 5 2 to
review current bankruptcy laws with a view toward restructuring the entire
system, exemptions were included in the areas of concern to be addressed by
the Commission. 153  The results of the Commission's work was the 1973
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 154 which was the basis for the four year long strug-
gle of completing a federal bankruptcy code for Congress' approval.
III. THE BIRTH OF SECTION 522
A. Legislative Hzstogy
The 1973 Bankruptcy Reform Act submitted by the Bankruptcy Com-
mission contained a completely re-worked provision for debtor's exemptions.
Section 4-503 of the Commission's report required all debtors, who were en-
titled to take exemptions, to take a single set of nationwide federal exemp-
tions when they applied for bankruptcy relief.' 55 The Commission's menu
of federal exemptions provided for the main course a $5,000 homestead ex-
emption. The homestead exemption would be taken in a personal resi-
dence' 56 with any remaining amount applied toward other exemptions.
15 7
The homestead exemption would function as a general cash exemption
available to debtors in bankruptcy for use as a shield for various family sup-
port and maintenance assets. The Commission served as appetizers a $1.000
exemption in "livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings,
tools of the trade or profession, and motor vehicles."'
58
For dessert the Commission would have allowed debtors to claim up to
$500 in accrued vacation pay and bonuses, alimony and support payments
without dollar limitation, proceeds from a life insurance policy if the insured
was a spouse of a dependent, rights in a pension plan, disability benefits,
workman's compensation or unemployment compensation payments, and
professionally prescribed health aids.' 59 The cash surrender value of life in-
151. See STANLEY & GIRTH, .rupra note 149, at 81. This Brookings Institute study on the
bankruptcy process concluded that:
Nevertheless the treatment of exemptions is characterized by both inequities and
waste motion.
The inequities are largely due to the often obsolete and extremely diverse provi-
sions of state exemption laws. . . The state laws now in effect tend to reflect the
values of rural life in the nineteenth century and vary greatly in specificity and
generosity.
Id at 81 (footnotes omitted).
152. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (amended Pub. L. No. 93-56, 87
Stat. 140 (1973)) [hereinafter referred to as Commission].
153. For an analysis of the Commission's recommendations on exemptions see generally
Plumb, The Recomendaions of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61
VA. L. REV. 1 (1975).
154. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTcY LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Part II, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 125, § 4-503 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as
COMMISSION REPORT].
155. Id
156. Id, § 4-503(b)(1). The label given the personal residence would have been irrelevant
as long as it was used as a home, i.e. a boat, a condominium. Id at 128 n.4.
157. Id at 125, § 4-503(b)(2).
158. Id, § 4-503(c)(1). Any remaining homestead exemption could be added to this exemp-
tion. See id § 4-503(b)(2).
159. Id, § 4-503(c).
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surance contracts owned by the debtor was also exempt up to $1500,160 and
if the cash surrender value exceeded $1500, the debtor could redeem the
contract by paying the Federal Bankruptcy Administrator the additional
cash surrender value.16 ' A unique aspect of the Commission's report would
have allowed the family of a deceased debtor, who died during the pendency
of bankruptcy administration, to take a living allowance of $1,000 per de-
pendent from the undistributed property of the debtor. 1
62
Administratively, all property of the debtor, whether exempt or not,
would have been part of the debtor's estate, reversing the 1898 Act's exclu-
sion of exempt property from assets administered by the trustee. 163 The
Commission specifically provided federal bankruptcy exemptions could not
be waived. ' 64 If a debtor transferred property, otherwise exempt, to defraud
creditors, then the right to claim that property as exempt would be for-
feited.' 6 5 Finally, the federal bankruptcy exemptions were to be paramount,
and would supersede any state exemption laws with respect to
bankruptcy. 1
66
It is hardly surprising that the Commission's exemption provisions were
attacked by other parties interested in bankruptcy reform. The National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges introduced their own counter-reform bill
within a few weeks of the filing of the Commission's bill. ' 6 7 The Judges' bill
contained an exemption list materially different from that in the Commis-
sion's list. The Judges' bill would have limited the debtors' claims to federal
exemptions to an aggregate of $25,000 for all property listed as exempt.168
Unlike the Commission's bill, the Judges' bill would continue to allow a
debtor to elect his state-created exemptions in lieu of the federal aggregate
exemption scheme.
169
Items of exempt property proposed by the Judges' bill was similar to the
Commission's bill, only the treatment of that property changed. The unique
family allowance for the survivors of deceased debtors in bankruptcy would
160. Id. at 126, § 4-503(d).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 4-503(e).
163. Id. at 147, § 4-601(a). See supra note 47.
164. Id. at 126, § 503(f). The statute read:
(f) Waiver; Liens. A waiver of exemptions is unenforceable by a creditor without se-
curity in the property allowed to the debtor pursuant to this section. A lien obtainable
by legal or equitable proceedings and, with respect to wearing apparel, household
goods, and health aids, any lien created by an agreement to give security other than
for a purchase money obligation, is unenforceable against the property allowed to the
debtor pursuant to this section as exempt, except that such lien may be preserved for
the benefit of the debtor.
Id. This provision would have overruled the Lockwood doctrine. See supra notes 114-126 and
accompanying text.
165. Id 126-27, § 4-504(h).
166. Id. at 125, § 4-504(a). This would also apply to any Internal Revenue Service exemp-
tions. See id. at 409- 10; Plumb, supra note 152, at 13.
167. See Bankruptcy Revision Act." Heanngs on H.R. 31 & 32 Before the Subcomr. on Civil & Const.
Rights of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1 (1975) (appendix) [herein-
after referred to as Appendix to Heartgs].
168. Id, at 146, § 4-503(a). The $25,000 ceiling applied only to the federal exemptions and




have been also included in the Judges' bill. 1 70 The Judges would have pro-
vided a larger homestead exemption of $6,000 plus a $600 additional exemp-
tion for each of the debtor's dependents. 17 1 The homestead exemption could
be used to exempt a burial plot, but no separate exemption existed for such
plot. 172 The homestead could have also been used to exempt cash surrender
value on any life insurance policy owned by the debtor.173 The Judges' bill
would have allowed debtors to take a $3,000 aggregate exemption for "live-
stock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools of the trade or
profession, and motor vehicles,"' 7 4 so long as debtors did not elect state
exemptions.
The Judges' bill was based on a different system of administration and
required the debtor to make an election of exempt property or be deemed to
have waived all exemption rights. 175 The Judges did agree with the Com-
mission that the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy would take title to all the
debtor's assets, exempt and non-exempt.1 76 By permitting debtors to choose
to take state exemptions as their federal exemptions, however, the Judges'
bill would have dragged into bankruptcy administration the old problems of
section 6 of the 1898 Act. If the debtor elected state exemptions in states
which permitted waiver of exemptions, then the debtor would have chosen
to allow creditors holding exemption waivers the special status allowed by
such laws. Because the judges voided waivers of exemptions, 177 this would
have given a powerful incentive for the filing of involuntary bankruptcy pe-
titions in the few states recognizing exemption waivers. The "hidden prefer-
ence" rule would be extended to claims for alimony and support payments
and intentional injuries to the person because many states have created ex-
ceptions to the exemptions for such claims.'
78
The proponents of the Judges' bill were the Federal Bankruptcy Judges
seeking status as article three judges. The bankruptcy specialists understood
the reason that others supported the bill was because of the creation of
debtor havens in states such as California and Texas.1 79 The preservation of
highly favorable state exemption laws would be an incentive for eligible
bankrupts to relocate to these states to take advantage of their generous ex-
emption laws. The adoption of generous federal exemptions as an alterna-
tive measure appealed to bankruptcy specialists in states like Pennsylvania
170. Id at 149, § 4-503(g). See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
171. Append&i to Hearings, supra note 166, at 146, § 4-503(b).
172. Id
173. Id. at 149, § 4-503(c). The life insurance policy exemption included "key man" insur-
ance proceeds. The debtor could pay for the cash surrender value that exceeded the limits of
the homestead exemption. Id
174. Id, at 147, § 4-503(e)(1). The Judges' did not exempt profit sharing plan rights and
stock bonus plan rights from creditors. Cf COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 153, at 126, § 4-
503(e)(6).
175. See Appendix to Hearings, supra note 166, at 146 § 4-503(a).
176. Id at 163, § 4-601(a). See supra text accompanying note 162.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 114-126.
178. Appendix to Hearings, supra note 166, at 150, § 4-503(h).
179. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 12, 1660, 1663-64 (March 12, 1976) (statement of L.E.




and Delaware whose state exemption laws grudgingly gave as little as possi-
ble to debtors.1 80 Thus, the proponents of the exemption scheme in the
Judges' bill were from various special interest groups.
The results of four years of debate, testimony,and congressional pushing
and shoving was the final version of the "new" bankruptcy exemptions con-
tained in section 522.11 The final bankruptcy reform bill, contains a mixed
set of exemption rules. As drafted, section 522 includes the exemption
scheme of the Judges' bill. The debtor can elect either the federal exemp-
tions contained in section 522 or the exemptions of his domiciliary state. 182
If the debtor fails to claim an exemption then he waives all rights in that
exempt property.
1 83
Section 522 exempts from bankruptcy claims the debtor's interest in
property held as a tenant in the entirety.' 8 4 Continuing the 1898 Act's pol-
icy on post-discharge exemptions, exempt assets are not liable to the claims
of non-dischargeable creditors after bankruptcy.18 5 Basically, the federal ex-
emption menu includes a $7,500 homestead exemption in personal residence
and burial plot,' 8 6 $1200 in a debtor's equity in a single motor vehicle,1
8 7
$200 per item in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops or musical instruments held ordinarily for
personal, family or household use,188 $500 in personal jewelry,' 8 9 and a $400
general cash exemption allowable against any property together with any
unused homestead. 19° Similar to prior bankruptcy acts, the Committee
Hearings on the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1976 and 1977 contain little
testimony on these bankruptcy exemptions.' 9 '
During last minute horsetrading between the Senate and the House,
major portions of section 522 were revised and submitted to the House with-
out comment. Exempt property was added or stricken from the federal
menu, and dollar amounts were altered without explanation.192 A further
administrative change of major proportion was made-allowing states to
180. See e.g., Hearings, supra note 12, 1537, 1539 (March 5, 1976) (prepared statement of
Louis W. Levit, Chairman of Special Committee of the Judiciary Commercial Law League of
America).
181. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2549, 2586 (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§ 522 (1982)).
182. Id. § 522(b)(1).
183. See § 522(b)(1).
184. Id § 552(b)(2).
185. Compare id. § 522(b)(2)(B) with supra note 145 and accompanying text.
186. Id. § 522(c).
187. Id § 522(d)(1). These dollar limitations were lowered from those originally recom-
mended. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
188. Id § 522(d)(2).
189. Id § 522(d)(3).
190. Id. § 522(d)(4).
191. Id § 522(d)(5). Other property exemptions allowed are: $750 for tools of trade,
§ 522(d)(6); unmatured life insurance contracts, § 522(d)(7); professionally prescribed health
aids, § 522(d)(9); various public assistance benefits, § 522(d)(10); and, victim reparation act
awards or wrongful death payments, § 522(d) (11).
192. Two statements located that relate to exemptions are: Hearings on S2266 & H R 8200
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in judicial Machine7y of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 617, 619 (1978) (supplemental statement of the Commercial Law League of
America) [hereinafter cited as Hearings-Improvements]; Hearings-mprovements, at 650-51, 654-55
1984]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
vote their citizens out of the federal exemption scheme altogether. 193 The
final product of the federal bankruptcy exemption statute is full of contra-
dictions, unresolved conflicts, and ambivalence.
B. Provisions of Section 522 as Enacted
Today, section 522 provides two alternative exemption menus to debt-
ors: the federal menu in section 522(d) or the state-created menus of each
state. By statute, a state legislature could deprive its domiciliaries of electing
the federal menus, forcing them to take only the state menu. As mentioned
above, the federal menu consists of exemptions limited by dollar amounts,
along with exemptions limited by a court determination of the amount "rea-
sonably necessary for support" of the debtor, exemptions limited both by
dollar amount and a support standard, unlimited exemptions, and alterna-
tive exemptions.
1. Exemptions Limited by Dollar Amount
Besides the dollar limited exemptions, any unused portion of the home-
stead exemption can be used, together with a $400 allowance,' 94 as a "wild
card" against any property of the debtor.' 95 The debtor can also collect an
exemption of up to $200 for "any item" of household furnishings, household
goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instru-
ments that are held for personal, family or household use.'
9 6
2. Exemptions Limited by Amount "Reasonably Necessary for
Support"
Section 522 exempts benefits payable to the debtor based on a judicial
determination by the bankruptcy judge of what the debtor and his depen-
dents require as reasonably necessary for their support. 197 When an exemp-
tion requires the bankruptcy judge to determine what is reasonably
necessary for the debtor's future support, the judge must exempt what is
necessary from the property right,'9 8 leaving the rest to be turned over to the
trustee in bankruptcy for division among the debtor's creditors. These prop-
erty right exemptions, limited by a support standard, are designed to be
(statements of Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., Chairman, Subcomm. on Bankruptcy, National Consumer
Finance Association).
The companion measure of the Bankruptcy Reform Act presented to the Senate adopted
the exemption scheme of section 6, of the 1898 Act-eliminating any federal exemptions. See
Hearngs-mprovements, at 835 (prepared statement of the National Bankruptcy Conference) (ar-
guing against returning to such a scheme).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
194. Id. § 552(d)(5).
195. Id. § 552(d)(4).
196. Id. § 552(d)(3).
197. Id. § 522(d)(10), (II).
198. Property rights that require a "reasonably necessary determination are: alimony, sup-
port, or separate maintenance payments, § 522(d)(10)(D); pension, profit sharing, or similar
plan, § 522(d)(10)(E); a wrongful death award, § 522(d)(11)(B); if the debtor is a dependent, life




treated as post-bankruptcy welfare payments to keep the debtor off the relief
rolls.
3. Exemptions Limited by Both Dollar Amount and Other
Standards
Section 522(d)(11)(D) arbitrarily limits debtors to a $7,500 exemption
for recovery on personal injuries to the debtor or to someone whom the
debtor depends on for support.1 99 This exemption excludes any compensa-
tion for pain and suffering or for "actual pecuniary loss". 2° ° Congress did




Certain types of welfare-related entitlements are exempted by Congress
without any limitations. Some of these entitlements are professionally pre-
scribed health aids, social security, and veterans' benefits."'20 2 Congress of-
fered no particular explanation for its determination that these entitlements
should be treated differently than those limited by a reasonable support
standard. 20 3 These exemptions should keep disabled, unemployed, or eld-
erly debtors off the relief rolls.
5. The Alternative Exemptions
If a debtor elected to take the federal non-bankruptcy exemptions, or
was forced to do so by his state's "opting out" statute, the debtor can qualify
for exemptions covered in other statutes. These other exemptions apply to
benefits similar to the ones covered in section 522, such as social security
benefits, 20 4 veteran's benefits, 20 5 and compensation and benefits under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 20 6 Additionally,
the debtor could take whatever exemptions his domiciliary state offered, to-
gether with all the headaches associated with administration of state exemp-
tion laws as federal bankruptcy exemptions, leaving open the question
whether such an "election" destroyed the anti-exemption waiver provisions
of section 522(e) 20 7 and the lien avoidance provisions of section 522(0.208
199. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D).
200. Id.
201. Id "Actual pecuniary loss" was not defined in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 362, reprintedhn 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS,
5787, 6318 ("designed to cover payments in compensation of actual bodily injury, such as the
loss of a limb, and is not intended to include the attendant costs that accompany such a loss,
such as medical payments, pain and suffering, or loss of earnings").
202. See generally §§ 522(d)(9), (10).
203. The committee report on the House version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act did not
mention why these entitlements were to be totally sheltered. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
205. 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982).
206. 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1982). Other alternative exemptions are: civil service retirement ben-
efits, 5 U.S.C. § 83 4 6(a) (1982); and, railroad unemployment and retirement benefits, 45 U.S.C.
§ 352(a), § 231(m) (1976).
207. Cf supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
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IV. SECTION 522 IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
The drafters of section 522 probably did not intend the disasters pro-
duced by their much-amended version of the old section 4-503 of the 1973
Bankruptcy Reform Act.20 9 Because Congress rejected the notion that the
best possible exemption scheme for administrative purposes would be a sin-
gle uniform federal menu of exempt assets, the drafters tried to harmonize
the debtor's election provisions of the Judges' bill with the comprehensive
scheme of the Commission's bill. During the process of compromising vari-
ous interests in 1978, the House and Senate agreed to a proviso by which
Congress delegated to all fifty states and each territory or district the author-
ity to pass federal bankruptcy exemption laws restricting domiciliaries to the
exemptions offered by the state or territory of their domicile. 2 '0 This ruined
the exemption scheme of section 522 because the subsections within section
522 no longer match up into clear categories. As the bankruptcy judges
struggle with this section, that problem and other major practical concerns
surrounding the section have grown.
A. The Sore Spots in the Categorical Exemption Menu
To claim exemptions, debtors have to fit their assets into the congres-
sional pigeonholes of section 522(d) or into the categorical classifications of
their state exemption laws. Fitting the assets in becomes a chore when terms
used for the exemption have specialized meanings.
1. Automobile as "Tool of the Trade"
Section 522(d)(2) allows a debtor to claim as exempt up to a $1200
equity in a single automobile. Section 522(d)(6) allows a similar exemption
of up to $750 in tools of the trade. Following tradition many states have
identified automobiles as "tools of the trade" for exemption purposes, if the
automobile has been used in any remote fashion for business or work pur-
poses. 21' If the automobile can be classified as exempt under both the auto-
mobile exemption and the tools of the trade exemption, a debtor can take
$1950 worth of equity in any automobile and, more importantly, claim the
right to avoid non-purchase money security interests against the automobile
under section 522(o.212 Taking one aspect of this possibility, several bank-
208. Recently the Supreme Court has held that the lien avoidance provision of section
522(0 can not be applied retroactively to destroy property rights existing before the Bankruptcy
Reform Act. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
209. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 153, at 125, § 4-503.
210. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1).
211. See, e.g., In re Sisemore, 602 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying Texas law); Sun, Ltd. v.
Casey, 96 Cal. App. 3d 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1979) (applying California law); see also Annot.,
37 A.L.R.2d 714, 719-32 (1954).
212. See id. § 522(f(2)(B). This subsection provides:
(0 Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing
of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien; or
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
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ruptcy courts have held that a car or truck can be exempt as a "tool of the
trade" under section 522(d)(6) and a non-possessory, nonpurchase money se-
curity interest on the vehicle can be set aside under § 522(f). 2 1 3 The com-
mon rationale for these decisions is the absence of congressional intent that
each category is distinct and separate, 2 14 and the state's own tradition of
classifying automobiles used in work roles as "tools of the trade". 215
Reaching the opposite conclusion of the interacting of the exemption
categories, a substantial minority of bankruptcy courts have held that sec-
tion 522(d)(2)'s itemization for a single automobile as exempt precludes a
"double-dip" by also exempting the car as a "tool of the trade" under section
522(d) (6).2 16 The rationale applied is that the separate listing of motor vehi-
cles in section 522(d) infers Congress did not intend motor vehicles to be a
"tool of the trade" for purposes of section 522(f). 2 17 These courts did not
inquire into the actual use of the vehicle, but simply held that mere use of
the vehicle as part of the debtor's job would not avoid a lien on the car
because it is not a "tool of the trade".
21 8
Both of these points of view are equally valid, considering the language
of section 522() 2 19 with the foreknowledge that "tool of the trade" has ac-
quired a "term of art" meaning in debtor-creditor law. 220 From the debtor's
viewpoint, setting aside a security interest in a motor vehicle is highly
advantageous.
2. Exemptions in Future Rights of Action of the Debtor
Section 522(d)(5) permits a debtor to claim a $400 exemption against
"any property".221 Section 522(d) (4) also authorizes the debtor to claim any
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for
the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or
the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.
213. In re Eagan, 16 Bankr. 439 (N.D. N.Y. 1982) (avoided a security interest in a truck, a
"tool of the trade"); In re Bechen, II Bankr. 939 (D. S.D. 1981) (non-possessory, nonpurchase
money lien avoided on a pickup truck, a "tool of the trade"); In re Seacord, 7 Bankr. 121 (W.D.
Mo. 1980) (creditor's lien avoided on a van, a "tool of the trade"). See also In re Dillon, 18
Bankr. 252 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (avoided creditor's lien so that wild card exemption could apply
towards truck, a "tool of the trade"); cf. In re Damron, 5 Bankr. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (evidence
insufficient to establish a car as a tool of trade). But see In re Curry, 18 Bankr. 358 (N.D. Ga.
1982) (tile setter's pickup truck not a tool of trade for lien purposes).
214. See, e.g.,In re Eagan, 16 Bankr. at 441-42.
215. See, e.g., In re Bechen, II Bankr. at 942; see also In re Goosey. 10 B.R. 285.
216. See, e.g., In re Steele, 8 Bankr. 94 (D. S.D. 1980) (automobile not a "tool of the trade,"
therefore non-possessory, nonpurchase money lien can not be avoided); In re Sweeney, 7 Bankr.
814 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (non-possessory, nonpurchase money lien not avoided because automobile
not a "tool of the trade").
217. In re Sweeney, 7 Bankr. at 818-19. But see In re Dubrock, 5 Bankr. 353, 355 (W.D. Ky.
1980) (enumeration elsewhere does not preclude a motor vehicle from being a tool of trade). See
In re Steele, 8 Bankr. at 95.
218. See, e.g., In re Curry, 18 Bankr. at 359.
219. See supra note 212.
220. See supra note 211.
221. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) provides: "The following property may be exempted under sub-
section (b)(l) of this section: . . . (5) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value
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"spillover" homestead exemption in addition to the $400 exemption. 2
This section allows a debtor to choose to take a portion of his exemption in
unliquidated, contingent claims against other parties. A problem with sec-
tion 522(d) is its lack of clarity as to whether a debtor is precluded from
using his "spillover" homestead exemption to take a larger share of future
entitlements, such as alimony, pension plans, or wrongful death payments
over and above the amount "reasonably necessary for support". It is also
questionable whether a debtor can exempt choses in action or the right to
sue some creditor, under section 522(d)(5). The right to sue a creditor for
violating the Federal Truth in Lending Act2 2 3 is one of the more popular
rights of action a debtor may have.
Initially, because of policy reasons, the bankruptcy courts refused to al-
low debtors to take exemptions in pre-filing consumer credit claims.
2 2 4 The
turning point came in In re LaFlamme,22 5 decided by the Bankruptcy Appeal
Panel for the First Circuit. The lower court bankruptcy had denied the
debtor's exemption claim for a Federal Truth in Lending Act action against
a creditor. 22 6 The Appeal Panel reversed, holding that "any property" in
section 522(d)(5) meant exactly that, any property which is property of the
estate with out limitation.
Apparently, Congress has no intention of limiting the ways in which
debtors can use the "wild card" exemption of section 522(d)(5) to protect
their assets. Consequently, because of the In re LaFlamme decision, any future
rights of recovery on claims arising out of credit transactions within the
bankruptcy itself should be held exempt on demand, up to the amount of
the dollar limitation. 227 Thus, any imbalance created by section 522(d)(5)
was intentional.
3. The Joint Petition and "Stacked" Exemptions
In light of section 522(m) 22 8 permitting married debtors to preserve
their own exemption rights upon filing joint petitions, special problems arise
$400 plus any unused amount of the exemption provided under (the homestead exemption], in
any property." .
222. See II U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(10)-(l 1).
223. There are various causes of action for a debtor under the Federal Truth in Lendng Act:
Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693retseq (1982); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681n-o (1982); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1982); Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1982). Similar rights of action are conferred by the
U.C.C. § 9-507 (1972); U.C.C.C. § 5.203 (1974); Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982); Clayton Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19-27 (1982); Robinson, Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13a-b & 21a (1982).
Other possible protection acts for the debtor are the: Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982); Taft-
Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982).
224. See In re Smith, 5 Bankr. 500 (D. Ill. 1980).
225. 14 Bankr. 21 (1st Cir. 1981) (construing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r and 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(5)).
226. 14 Bankr. at 21.
227. Id at 24, 26. The limitation would be the $400 general cash exemption plus any spil-
lover homestead exemption.
228. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) provides: "This section [522] shall apply separately with respect to
each debtor in a joint case."
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in administering the exemption rights when one joint debtor takes the fed-
eral exemptions and the other takes the state-created exemptions. The debt-
ors are clearly authorized to make their own elections and to agree to
combine them, even though the result might be to protect a substantial
homestead held as joint or community property and still be able to use the
"wild card" exemption with the spillover federal homestead exemption on
other property. 229 Several cases have legitimized such a procedure, because
the Bankruptcy Reform Act has made no attempt to forbid "stacking" ex-
emptions in this manner.2 30 The debtors' creditors gain nothing by the joint
filing for bankruptcy, and indeed may have lost an advantage, as both
spouses would be discharged, defeating any chance of pursuing the home-
stead property even after a divorce. Yet this result is what Congress desired
by passing section 522(m).
4. The "Any Item" Exemption
According to section 522(d)(3) a debtor can take an exemption in "any
item" of "household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli-
ances, books, crops, or musical instruments" which are owned for personal,
family, or household purposes.23 ' The only intrinsic limitation to this ex-
emption is the dollar limit of $200 on any single item. 23 2 Naturally, debtors
perceive that an unlimited number of "items" have a fair market value of
less than $100 would be exempt under this provision. Such a notion is sup-
ported by one bankruptcy court where it was held that two hundred individ-
ual pieces of a family set of sterling silver tableware were exempt under
section 522(d)(3) because none of the two hundred pieces alone were worth
more than $200.233 The aggregate, however, comprised more than $6,000
worth of exempt property.
234
The obvious loophole created by section 522(d) (3) has caught the eye of
at least one commentator, who considers the "any item" exemption to reflect
congressional judgment in permitting debtors to "stockpile" exemptions in
household items and books.23 5 Also by Congress' encouragement to convert
229. Se, e.g., In re Brennan 18 Bankr. 312 (D. R.I. 1982) (stacking federal exemptions); In re
Korff 14 Bankr. 189, (E.D. Mich. 1981) (stacking state exemptions); In re Maitland, 13 Bankr.
923 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (stacking state and federal exemptions).
230. Instead, Congress enacted section 522(m) with full knowledge of the large exemption
amounts possible. See In re Aailland, 13 Bankr. at 926.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3).
232. Id.
233. In re Wahl, 14 Bankr. 153 (E.D. Wis. 1981). In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted "item" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
234. See id at 156.
235. See Vukowich, supra note 55, at 783-85.
"[I]tems" seems to indicate that the House was using "items" to refer to the various
categories because of the reference back to those categories through the use of the word
"similar".
The more likely intention, however, was that the $200 limitation should apply to
items within the categories ...
Of course the suggested construction does result in a potentially huge exemption.
This construction would allow debtors to exempt most of their household goods and
personal effects . . . This result is consistent, however, with the House's manifested




non-exempt property into exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy fil-
ing,2 36 Congress did not realize the possibility that a debtor could liquidate
non-exempt assets and buy a two thousand volume personal library with
each book being priced under $200, and thus salvage a considerable cash
benefit by selling the books as second-hand materials after discharge in
bankruptcy. Similar conversion techniques can be used by debtors to turn
non-exempt gold Krugerrands into an exempt collection of crystal, or Irish
lace, or other high priced consumer goods. An imaginative debtor can use
section 522(d)(3) lawfully to shield vast sums against creditors in bank-
ruptcy. Congress provided no limits.
Congress aimed at setting up a system for rehabilitating debtors in fail-
ing circumstances. But Congress actually adopted something quite different
from what had been originally intended. The grafting of the exemption
provisions with the Commission bill and the Judges' bill, plus compromises
with other lobbies produced an exemption law which sets aside exemptions
categorically for liquidating bankruptcies. The mish-mash of federal and
state optional or mandatory exemptions has led to the situation in which
cunning debtors' attorneys can use "straight" bankruptcy as a shield for vast
amounts of carefully concocted mixtures of state and federal exempt assets.




Section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code promised to be a trouble-
maker as soon as it was passed. Unlike section 6 of the 1898 Act, this hastily
put together compromise delegates to each state the opportunity to forbid its
citizens to claim federal bankruptcy exemptions.2 38 Section 6 had allowed
state-created exemption laws as a federal rule of decision for the bankrupt's
Id at 784-85.
236. See id. at 809-10.
237. At the time the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was passed, bankruptcy filings began
to increase sharply. Many commentators and interest groups have concluded that the new
exemption laws were the prime cause of this sharp rise, neglecting other possible causes such as a
continuing business recession. &e Shuchman & Rhorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out
Hearings and Other Purposes, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1982).
According to the House Judiciary Committee, 196,967 personal bankruptcies were filed in
1979, the last year in which a majority of filings were under the 1898 Act. In 1980 the number
of personal bankruptcies increased 22.58% to 241,446. In 1981, 312,914 personal bankruptcies
were filed, for an increase of 29.6% over the year ending June 30, 1980. See Shuchman &
Rhorer, supra, at I n.3, citing House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Monopolies and
Commercial Law, Oct. 14, 1981, Table 1.
In a study of bankruptcy exemptions taken in Connecticut, it was found that over a two
year period a substantial number of homeowner debtors filed bankruptcy petitions to save their
homes from levying creditors. See id. at 20-22. The cause for such an increase is the federal law
provides a homestead exemption not available in Connecticut and this increase will likely be
seen in any state where the federal exemption exceeds the state's exemption. Id at 22.
238. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) provides:
[A]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate either-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the state
law that is applicable to the debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize; or, in the
alternative, . . .
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domicilary state.2 39 Although the Supreme Court held section 6 was consti-
tutional in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 240 the "opting-out" provision of
section 522(b)(1) is clearly neither a congressional attempt to establish "uni-
formity" in bankruptcy, nor is it a decision not to pre-empt state insolvency
laws. Thirty-one states adopted "opting-out" statutes within a short time
after the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 24 1 Most of the "opting-
out" statutes do not allow state citizens the type and quantity of exemptions
permitted by section 522(d) for persons eligible to elect the federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions.
2 4 2
1. Cheeseman v. Nachman
Virginia's "opting out" statute was challenged on constitutional
grounds in Cheeseman v. Nachman.243 Virginia allows a homestead exemption
of $5,000 for "every householder or head of a family" residing in Virginia.
24
"Householder" is defined as someone "who maintains a separate residence of
living quarters, whether or not others are living with him."'245  The
Cheesemans filed a joint petition and claimed the right to "stack" their
homestead exemptions to protect their home. 246 The Fourth Circuit held
such "stacking" was permissible.
247
The Fourth Circuit noted that section 541 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act made exempt property part of the debtor's estate, subject to any exemp-
tion claims.248 Then under section 522(m) debtors filing jointly can take the
same exemptions as if they had filed separate petitions. 249 Because the defi-
nition of "householder" was ambiguous the Fourth Circuit recognized that
the statute could mean either only one person was entitled to take a home-
239. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
240. Ve supra text accompanying notes 102-13.
241. As of June, 1983, the states which have taken advantage of section 522(b)(1) to "opt-
out" of section 522(d) include: ALA. CODE § 6-10-11 (Supp. 1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-1133(B) (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 36-211 (Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4914 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-
100(b) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 11-609 (Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 12-1201 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-0.5 (West Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 627.10 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2312 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 427.170
(Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881B (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.




(g) (1984); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 31-2-106 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-15,105 (Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.090
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2-a (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IC-1601( (1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-22-17 (Supp. 1983); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.662 (Page 1981) (repealed
138 H674, § 3, effective Jan. 1, 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § I(B) (West 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 23.305 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-425 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 43-31-30 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-
15 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (Supp. 1983): WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-20-109 (Supp. 1983).
242. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504 (1984).
243. 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981).
244. VA. CODE § 34-4 (supp. 1983).
245. Id. § 34-1.
246. See 656 F.2d at 61 & n.2 (The Cheeseman's would apply S4,700 to their homestead
with the remaining $5,300 used towards other personalty).
247. Id at 64.
248. Id. at 62.
249. Set supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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stead exemption in a joint petition or "householder" status can be conferred
on any person who contributed to the maintenance of a residence. 250 The
latter construction was upheld because Virginia intended the statute to be
liberally construed to conserve the family home.
2 51
More importantly the Fourth Circuit went on to say that such construc-
tion was required by section 522(m) "[blecause Congress has the power
under the Constitution to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, . . . and has
enacted a specific provision for exemptions, . . . we must adopt an interpre-
tation of Virginia's law that does not conflict with the Act's exemption pro-
vision."2 52 In light of Congress' desire to give debtors a "fresh start" after
bankruptcy, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the state exemptions forced on
debtors by a state "opting out" act must meet all the needs of section 522,
including the right to "stack" exemptions. 253 The inference is a construction
that would allow only one joint debtor to claim a "homestead" would be
unconstitutional, because Congress has pre-empted federal bankruptcy ex-
emption laws by delegating to states the power to pass a federal bankruptcy
statute.254 Thus, only an exemption pattern which allowed debtors all fed-
eral exemption rights would be constitutionally permissible.
2. In re Parrsh
Other federal bankruptcy courts have held section 522(b)(1) and the
"opt-out" statutes of Colorado, Ohio, and Florida as constitutional. 255 The
Colorado case, In re Parrish ,256 illustrates how courts have dealt with "opting-
out". The debtor argued that Colorado's "opting-out" statute violated the
supremacy clause257 because it conflicted with the federal exemption scheme
of providing a "floating" exemption. 258 The court rejected this contention,
holding that Congress meant the states to "opt-out" but in doing so, hopefully
update their statutes to be more in line with the "fresh start" concept. 259 In
250. See id at 63.
251. [Tlhis purpose can best be promoted by a reading of the statute that allows an
exemption to each spouse who contributes to the maintenance of the home: if both
spouses are granted exemptions, for example, they are more likely to be left with suffi-
cient equity to allow them to retain their home.
Id To apply the contrary construction would be "an inducement to separate" so that each may
claim the exemption. Id.
252. Id (citations omitted).
253. It does not follow, however, that the states should be left free to classify which
bankrupt debtors should be entitled to exemptions when the classification conflicts
with federal law. If we were to permit a construction of Virginia law that allows only
one householder per residence, the construction would be inconsistent with section
522(m) of the Act ...
Id. at 64.
254. Id
255. See In re Parrish, 19 Bankr. 331 (D. Colo. 1982); In re Lausch, 16 Bankr. 162 (M.D.
Fla.), aft'g, 12 Bankr. 55 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Curry, 5 Bankr. 282 (N.D. Ohio 1980), a d sub
nom., Curry v. Associates Fin. Servs., 11 Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981), vacated, 698 F.2d 298 (6th
Cir. 1983); In re Ambrose, 4 Bankr. 395 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
256. 19 Bankr. 331 (D. Colo. 1982).
257. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. See 19 Bankr. at 334.
258. The "floating" exemption refers to the $7,500 homestead exemption plus the $400 gen-
eral cash exemption provided in section 522. See id at 335.
259. 19 Bankr. at 334-35.
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rejecting the debtor's argument the court applied the rationale of Perez v.
Campbell: 26° that the court need only compare the two statutes and consider
whether there is a conflict of provisions. 26 1 The court concluded that both
the Colorado "opting-out" statute and the federal exemption statute gave
the debtor a "fresh start," therefore, the Colorado opt-out provision is consti-
tutional regardless of the lack of a so-called "floating" exemption.
262
3. In re Kelley
In re Kelley 263 presented a direct challenge to the Florida opt-out stat-
ute.264 A single person claimed she was denied a homestead exemption in
bankruptcy because Florida's "opting-out" statute required her to claim the
Florida homestead, but to claim the exemption she must be the head of a
family. 265 The statute had previously been sustained in In re Lausch266 on
the more typical challenge that section 522(b)(1) violated the "uniformity"
requirement of the Constitution.26 7 Kelley claimed that it was unconstitu-
tional in her case to allow Florida to fail to provide a homestead exemption
for a single person; whereas, section 522(d)(1) made express provisions for a
single person's homestead. 268 Kelley's claim was rejected by the court based
on the doctrine of Reed v. Reed:269 a classification must be reasonable and
have a substantial bearing on the legislative objective. 270 Allowing a home-
stead exemption for married persons bore a fair and substantial relationship
to the objectives of the Florida exemption law, that of safeguarding the fam-
ily. 27 ' The court ignored the issue of federal pre-emption of bankruptcy
exemptions.
4. In re Sullivan
In In re Sulhvan ,272 the Sullivans had claimed an exemption menu from
section 522(d) after Illinois had "opted out" and enacted its own homestead
and personal property exemptions. 273 The trustee's objection to the claimed
federal exemptions was sustained by the bankruptcy judge and affirmed by
260. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
261. 19 Bankr. at 334, quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 644. Cf infia note 293.
262. 19 Bankr. at 335.
263. 21 Bankr. 375 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
264. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West Supp. 1983).
265. 21 Bankr. at 375-76.
266. 16 Bankr. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
267. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. See also supra notes 93-128 and accompanying text.
268. 21 Bankr. at 376.
269. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, a state statute that gave males mandatory preference to
administer the estate of an intestate relative was held to be the type of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
270. See 404 U.S. at 415.
271. 21 Bankr. at 376-77. The court stated that the homestead act was designed to promote
the welfare of the state by "preserving a home where the family may be sheltered and live
beyond the reach of economic misfortune," thus putting the family on a higher plane than
single persons. Id By implication, the court was following the rule of Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195-96 (1819), holding a state may pass its own insolvency law. See infra
note 291 & notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
272. 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.), a'g II Bankr. 432 (C.D. Ill. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 349
(1982).
273. 680 F.2d at 1132.
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the Seventh Circuit. 274 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the debtors had
contended the Illinois "opting out" statute275 was an unconstitutional act
because it was non-uniform, and that section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act was an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority to
Illinois.
276
In dealing with the issue of uniformity, the Seventh Circuit rejected any
contention that section 522(b) requires the state, which "opted-out" of the
federal exemption, to adopt an exemption scheme essentially similar to that
of section 522(d).2 77 "In a limited sense, section 522 meets the test of true
uniformity because the opt-out provision is applicable to each State. True
uniformity as to individual debtors clearly does not exist, however, because
the opt-out provision allows exemption levels to differ among the states. '278
That assertion is somewhat circular. The court accepted the principle of
"geographic uniformity" formulated in Moses,279 and applied it to the Illi-
nois act. 280 Although the Sullivan's cited precedent supporting the conclu-
sion that Congress could not use state-created laws to establish a federal rule,
the court rejected that line of authority because "[w]hatever merit this argu-
ment might have, we think it is foreclosed, at least as to the 1898 Act, by
MAoSeS."281
The debtors contended Moyses was either wrongfully decided or was in-
applicable to the Bankruptcy Reform Act because of the fundamentally dif-
ferent way in which the debtor's estate is administered under the 1978 Act.
After a cursory examination of the lack of any legislative history on "opting-
out" provision, the court stated:
The opt-out provision, section 522(b)(1), for which there is virtu-
ally no legislative history, was added to section 522 as a compro-
mise provision . . . [t]he intention of providing a 'fresh start' can
be attributed only to the House. A resolve to let states determine
the applicable exemptions must be attributed to the Senate. Con-
gress did not resolve this difference. . . This court cannot seize
upon the motivation of the House as representative of the entire
Congress when the enacted legislation clearly warrants a contrary
274. Id. at 1138.
275. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 1 12-1201 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
276. 680 F.2d at 1131-32. See Comment, Bankrupticy Exemptions.- Whether Illinois's Use of the
Federal "Opt-Out" Provison s Constitutional, 1981 S. ILL. L.J. 65.
Illinois' exemption scheme affords a $10,000 homestead exemption only for real estate oc-
cupied as a residence. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 1 12-901 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (this has since been
lowered to $7,500). The Illinois personal property exemption was limited to wearing apparel, a
bible, school books, and $300 worth of property, compared to the more generous provisions of
section 522(d). See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 12-1001 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (these provisions
have been amended). There is no general cash exemption against "any" property in Illinois. See
Id
277. 680 F.2d at 1136.
278. Id. at I133. See supra note 92.
279. See supra text accompanying note 109.
280. Id. at 1133-36.
281. Id at 1135. The debtors had cited Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981), in
which the Fourth Circuit held that the United States could not adopt a state law test for the
requisite lack of "good moral character" necessary to deport. The rationale being that to apply





Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that congressional policy did not
require it to find the 1978 Act so different from the 1898 Act as to make
Moyses inapplicable.
283
The court then turned to the analysis of the preemption claim based on
In re RhodeS284 and Cheeseman v. Nachman .285 The bankruptcy court decision
in In re Rhodes was discredited because it applied the preemption argument
despite the explicit language of section 522(b)(1). 28 6 The Seventh Circuit
refused to accept the line of reasoning in Cheeseman that "opting-out" did not
permit Virginia to avoid the effects of section 522(m). 28 7 If Congress had the
power to delegate to the states the right to set their own exemptions, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned, then the Illinois statute was constitutional. 288
The Sullvan court misapplied the debtors' argument on the constitu-
tionality of the "opt-out" clause in section 522(b)(1). 289 First, the debtors
contention that the entire scheme of bankruptcy exemptions in the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act is so materially different from that of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 should be given weight. Moyses is no longer precedent for
supporting the exemption scheme granted to states by section 522(b)(1). 290
Second, the debtors correctly argue that Moyses, if held applicable, is not
now the policy of the Supreme Court and ought not to be followed as the
last word on "unifromity on the subject of bankruptcies". 29 1  Section
522(b)(1) cannot be considered uniform in any sense of the word. It neither
mandates geographic uniformity nor any other form of uniform exemptions
in bankruptcy, but does precisely the opposite. Third, if Congress has the
authority to delegate to states the power to pass a federal bankruptcy exemp-
tion law, an argument seemingly approved by Sturges,292 then that law
282. 680 F.2d at 1136.
283. See id at 1134, 1136. Similar to the decision in Moyses, which did not discuss the differ-
ences between the 1867 Act and the 1898 Act, the Seventh Circuit did not analyze the difference
between the 1898 Act and the 1978 Act in reaching its conclusion. For example, in the old law,
a finding that property was exempt was a finding that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction
over the property; while under the 1978 Act, the trustee is initially vested with title, possession,
and control over all property, and upon allowance of exemptions to the debtor, the trustee re-
vests title, possession, and control of the exempt property to the debtor.
284. 14 Bankr. 629 (M.D. Tenn. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 427 (1983). After the In re Sullivan decision, Rhodes was reversed,
following Sullivan's approval of the Moyses doctrine that uniformity is geographical rather than
personal.
285. 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981).
286. 680 F.2d at 1136.
287. Id at 1136-37. See supra text accompanying notes 244-55.
288. Id at 1137. The Seventh Circuit also dismissed the improper delegation of power ar-
gument by relying on Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122 (1819) (state law can not
conflict with federal law).
289. This same argument was misapplied in Rhodes. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159
(6th Cir. 1983).
290. See 680 F.2d at 1134-35.
291. See Brief for Petitioner, at 15, Sullivan v. United States, No. 82-5229 (U.S. filed in Oct.,
1982).
292. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122, 195-96 (1819).
It is fundamental that the state and federal legislatures share concurrent authority
to promulgate bankruptcy laws, Sturges v. Crowingshie/d [sic], 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 119
[sic], 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819), and that the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of preemp-
tion will serve to invalidate state promulgations to the extent that they are inconsistent
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should be made by a specific federal pre-emptive power much the same way
that states may "opt-out" of the Truth in Lending Act. 29 3 Therefore, Illi-
nois' exemption statute, should not be decreed "uniform" because it is not a
proper exercise of Congress' delegation power and because the statute frus-
trates Congress' purpose in passing a federal bankruptcy exemption law.
2 9 4
5. The Bankruptcy Reform Act is Not Uniform
In fairness to the country, the Supreme Court should either overrule
Moyses or limit its authority to section 6 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. Moyses
was decided at a time when most of the United States' population lived on
subsistence farms and in small towns. The degree of personal mobility in
1901 was far less than that of today's urban wage earners and salaried help.
In a static rural society, it might have been reasonable to allow the states to
set up federal bankruptcy exemptions which offered no incentive to state
domiciliaries to file bankruptcy petitions when pressed by creditors. Since
the turn of the century, however, Americans have increasingly become citi-
zens of the United States first and citizens of their state only secondarily.
295
Individual state exemption laws do not take into account that debtors are
apt to have property located in several states, or have obligations to support
families living in another state.296 Ignoring for a moment the question of the
adequacy of state-created exemption laws as mechanisms for a "fresh start",
too many debtors have assets in too many different states with vastly differ-
ent exemption laws to make a state-by-state bankruptcy exemption system
appropriate.
Congress is required to make uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy
exemptions,29 7 and as such Congress should be held to the requirement that
its bankruptcy exemptions are national in scope as well as in origin. The
principle of "geographic uniformity" is a subterfuge by which the courts
may ignore the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution. The process is not
uniform when a debtor in bankruptcy, depending on his domicile, can claim
a $60,000 homestead exemption in Massachusetts 298 or none if he is in Penn-
with or contrary to federal laws. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S. Ct. 1704, 29
L.Ed. 2d 233 (1971). It is equally axiomatic, however, that Congress has not pre-
empted an area wherein it has legislated when it expressly and concurrently authorizes
the state legislatures to disregard or opt-out of such federal legislative area.
Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1983).
293. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1982) (states can adopt statutes that are parallel and more
stringent than the federal statutes). The Sixth Circuit presumed that the source of the legal
power to enact exemption legislation was not an act of Congress, but a pre-constitutional resi-
due of general police power regulation.
294. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 292, at 23-27. Purpose refers to the notion of providing
a fresh start. See 680 F.2d at 1136.
295. Since 1890, the percent of Americans who resided in the state census tracts in which
they were born has steadily declined from 90.7% of all Americans in 1900 to 79.4% as of 1970.
Histoncal Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of
the Census 1975) Series C-1-14 at 89.
296. For a description of what little is known empirically about the assets of debtors, see
Schuchman, Little Bankruptcies in New England, 56 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1976) (debtors in bank- (
ruptcy are less stable than the rest of the community, tending to move more often, and to collect
their property in more than one community).
297. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 4.
298. MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 188 § 1 (Supp. 1984).
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sylvania. 299 If the state has no opt-out law, as is the case in Pennsylvania, he
may elect the section 522 exemption scheme.
C. "Opting-Out" and Lien Avoidance
One of the hidden problems created by "opting-out" of section 522(d) is
the language of section 522(0300, allowing avoidance ofjudicial liens against
exempt property and non-purchase money security interest in household
goods, tools of trade or professional prescribed health aids. Section 522(0
permits avoidance "to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to
which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section."
30o
A serious internal conflict exists in section 522. For instance, Ohio has
opted-out of section 522(b) and prescribes in its state-created exemption laws
that a lien can impair exempt property. 30 2 The issue of whether Ohio can
enforce liens on exempt property despite section 522(f) has gone both
ways. 30 3 There appears to be no clear trend among the states on the relation-
ship of the opt-out provision and other parts of section 522 such as section
522().304
1. In re McManus
Consider In re McManus30 5 involving Louisiana's "opt-out" provision
30 6
and whether a debtor can avoid a nonpurchase money security interest in
household goods. Relying on the opt-out provision, the bankruptcy court
had denied the avoidance of the lien because Louisiana's exemption laws
precluded any exemption in encumbered household goods.30 7 In Gipson, the
companion case to In re McManus, the bankruptcy judge had allowed the
debtor to avoid a non-purchase money security interest in household
goods.30 8 The Fifth Circuit affirmed McManus and reversed Gipson .309
299. Pennsylvania, as of the date of this article, has no homestead exemption law.
300. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). See supra note 211.
301. Id
302. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.661(C) (1981) reads as follows: "Section 2329.66 of the
Revised Code does not affect or invalidate any sale, contract of sale, conditional sale, security
interest, or pledge of any personal property, or any lien created thereby."
303. See, e.g., Foster v. City Loan & Say. Co., 16 Bankr. 467 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (holding
household goods can be encumbered because Congress intended states to enact whatever ex-
emption statutes they wished); Curry v. Associates Fin. Serv., 11 Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(holding liens on household goods can be avoided because the Ohio statute directly conflicts
with section 522(o).
304. See generally supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of labeling
a motor vehicle as a tool of trade on section 522(o). See also In re Giles, 18 Bankr. 708 (E.D.
Tenn. 1982) (applying Georgia's opt-out clause did not prevent the avoidance of a lien on
household goods); In re Frederickson, 12 Bankr. 506 (D. S.D. 1981) (can avoid a non-purchase
money agreement in household goods under section 522(f) even though South Dakota opted out
of section 522(d)).
305. 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).
306. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881B (West Supp. 1984).
307. 681 F.2d at 354. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3885 (West Supp. 1984) (household
goods subject to a mortgage are not exempt).
308. 681 F.2d at 354.
309. Id. at 357.
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The court began its analysis by noting that all assets are vested with the
trustee as part of the debtor's estate, whereupon any exempt property is re-
vested in the debtor. 3 10 Then the Fifth Circuit applied a logical three-step
approach to its holding that Louisiana can hinder exempt property that is
subject to an encumberance. 3 11 First, the court found section 522() is not a
separate statute and is dependent upon the exemption provisions of section
522(b).3 1 2 Second, the court examined section 522(b), noting it provided
two exemption schemes: the federal list or the state-created list. Recogniz-
ing section 522(b) does not limit what a state can enact for exemptions,
3 13
the Fifth Circuit considered Louisiana's statutes in its third step. Because
Louisiana explicitly provides any encumbered household goods will not be
exempt in bankruptcy, section 522(f) does not apply under the authority of
section 522(b).
3 14
Judge Dyer dissented.3 15 He considered the execution of a nonpurchase
money lien on household goods as a waiver of exemptions, "subject to the
avoiding power found in § 522(f).
' 316
If the majority opinion correctly states the law, any state can by
statute preclude a debtor from availing himself of the lien avoid-
ance provisions found in 522(f). . . . There is no provision of the
Bankruptcy Code which grants the states authority to pre-empt
any subsection of § 522(f) other than subsection (b), . . . . Con-
gress intended that even if a state opts out of the federal exemp-
tions, the debtor's lien avoidance power under subsection (0 is not
thereby affected.
3 17
According to Judge Dyer, the majority ignored the conflict between Louisi-
ana's exemption laws and federal policy expressed in section 522(f), which
"must be constitutionally resolved in favor of federal law."' 31 8
If the McManus decision stands, then a state can lawfully "opt-out" not
only from section 522(d), but from sections 522(f), 522(g), and 522(m) as
well. 319 Arguments about congressional intent relative to "opting-out" are
310. Id at 354, cihg section 541 of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 541. This is one ad-
ministrative provision that both the Commission and the Judges' agreed upon. See supra text
accompanying notes 162 & 174.
311. Id at 357.
312. Id at 355.
313. Id. at 355-56.
Significantly, the section does not mandate that debtors be guaranteed a right to ex-
empt particular types of property. The unambiguous language of section 522(b) im-
plicitly indicates a state may exempt the same property included in the federal
laundry list, more property than that included in the federal laundry list, or less prop-
erty than that included in the federal laundry list. The states also may prescribe their
own requirements for exemptions, which may either circumscribe or enlarge the list of
exempt property.
Id (footnote omitted).
314. Id. at 357. The Fifth Circuit noted hypothetically that if Louisianna had not specifi-
cally defined mortgaged household goods and furnishings a different result would have been
granted: section 522(o would have been available to avoid liens encumbering exempt property.
See id.
315. Id at 357 (Dyer, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 358.
317. Id
318. Id
319. These sections of II U.S.C. § 522 and others form a single system of exemption rights
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essentially meaningless, as Congress' intent can be found only by reading
section 522(b)(1). The drastic lack of uniformity, either actual or geographi-
cal, produced by the congressional authorization to state legislatures to man-
gle the bankruptcy exemption laws, simply underscores the
unconstitutionality of section 522(b)(1). Sections 522(f), (g), and (m) may
apply to some states but not others. In Louisiana 320 and in Ohio, 32' a
debtor may have no right to assert a claim to avoid a nonpurchase money
security interest in household goods, but in another state such as Illinois,
322
which has also "opted-out", such a denial would be unconstitutional and
void.
The unsupported conclusion in Moyses that Congress has the power to
delegate to the states the duty to pass bankruptcy exemption laws is as un-
founded as the holding in Moyses that adopting those state bankruptcy ex-
emptions is "uniform". 323 In the past, Congress has delegated authority to
federal agencies to make rules having the force of law. Almost all of these
delegations have been sustained against similar attacks of unconstitutional
delegation based on the "necessary & proper" clause. 324 Occasionally Con-
gress has delegated authority to "drop out" of a nationwide federal regula-
tory scheme, such as the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act.325
No delegation challenge directed at the bankruptcy statutes has been
sustained 326 because of its special article I status.32 7 Congress may delegate
regulation of commerce to the states, but it may not delegate the passage of
"uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy" to the states, as it has at-
tempted to do in section 522(b)(1). Moyses is the only Supreme Court case
suggesting that Congress has the power to delegate its bankruptcy clause
powers to the states. No jurisprudential history of Supreme Court cases sup-
ports such a delegation. Any reliance on Sturges v. Crown'nshid 3 28 as an im-
plicit authorization for Congress to hand out its bankruptcy jurisdiction to
the states is misplaced. 329 The issue of delegation of authority was neither
under federal bankruptcy law, all of which depends on section 522(b). For instance, an "opting
out" act in a state that wished to deny debtors any of the federal rights in section 522 under the
McManus doctrine could contain clauses stating: that exemptions under state law may be
waived by the debtor; that any voidable preference, or fraudulent transfer, or property under a
lien avoidable under section 724 cannot be held exempt; that any assets of the debtor turned
over to the estate may not be taken as exempt; and, that no citizen of the state may take any
exemption in any property incumbered by a judicial lien or by a non-purchase money security
agreement.
320. See supra text accompanying note 305.
321. See suora notes 301-02.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 272-88.
323. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
324. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
149, §§ 3:1-3:7 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1983). Cf Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(delegation of power to coal producers and workers unconstitutional).
325. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1982) (state laws not affected unless inconsistent with the
federal chapter).
326. See, e.g. ,In re Lausch, 16 Bankr. 162, 165 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (it is not an unconstitutional
delegation but a recognition of concurrent power).
327. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 196-97 (1819).
328. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
329. See supra note 291.
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contended for by either party nor addressed in Justice Marshall's opinion.
330
Congressional delegation of a federal power to non-federal entities
should be narrowly circumscribed and carefully limited to those few cases in
which vital, concurrent interests of both the state and federal governments
coincide. 33 1 Bankruptcy law is not such an aggregation of vital, concurrent
interests. But, if it is viewed as such a matter on which both state and fed-
eral legislatures have a mutual interest, the delegation of federal authority
must be limited and precise-not a broadly worded escape hatch. The force
of the argument presented in Cheeseman v. Nachman, cancelling state acts
which conflict with general federal bankruptcy policies, 332 makes good sense.
Congress did not delegate, as alleged in McManus,333 its authority to the
states only to have it exercised helter-skelter. If the courts are willing to hold
the principle of delegation constitutional, the type of delegation done in sec-
tion 522(b)(1) must be judicially confined to statutes which are similar in all
essential respects to sections 522(a) through (m). Deviation, such as that
countenanced by McManus, in enacting exemptions would be not uniform
and too broad an exercise of delegated federal power.
V. A REAPPRAISAL OF EXEMPTION THEORY AND LAW IS REQUIRED
A. Exemption Theoy
The current theory behind the exemptions of section 522 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is that of the "fresh start. ' 334 Although various commentators
have suggested exemption schemes that should be sufficient for a "fresh
start", 335 the words are ephemeral and do not point toward anything defi-
nite that courts are able to follow in dealing with bankruptcy exemptions.
The concept of "fresh start" originated with the National Bankruptcy Com-
330. The primary issue of concern was whether a New York insolvency law impaired the
constitutional right to contract and that such contracts may not be impaired. See 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 197-208. In this setting Justice Marshall wrote:
It has been said, that Congress has exercised this power [to enact uniform laws on
bankruptcy]; and, by doing so, has extinguished the power of the States, which cannot
be revived by repealing the law of Congress.
We do not think so. If the right of the states to pass a bankrupt law is not taken
away by the mere grant of that power to Congress, it cannot be extinguished; it can
only be suspended, by the enactment of a general bankrupt law.
Id. at 196. See In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d at 1137 (relied on Sturges for delegating to states the
power to pass exemption laws).
331. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 322, at 206-16, § 3:15 (suggesting that the courts
should look at whether the congressional delegation of legislative authority should be limited by
safeguards supplied by the object of delegated authority; and, if not, the court should intervene
to prevent arbitrary exercise of delegated authority).
The Supreme Court has stated that:
the presence or absence of standards is the key to the validity of legislative delegation
that has never been the law and it cannot be, because the behavior of any responsible
officer will be the same whether the statue states no standard or whether it says "just
and equitable" or "in the public interest."
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE SUPPLEMENT 21, § 2.00 (1976).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 245-53. See also Rhodes, 705 F.2d 159.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 317-22.
334. See HOUSE REPORT supra note 9 at 6087 (defining "fresh start").
335. See, e.g., STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 149 at 206. This treatise details bankruptcy
exemptions that are "designed to permit the bankrupt to continue his occupation and to main-
tain a standard of living reasonably consistent with his occupation and previous history." Id
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mission's report on the 1973 Bankruptcy Reform Act. 336 It was hypothe-
sized in that report that bankruptcy, which affects larger numbers of wage
earners and salaried persons that it does business entities, should allow the
debtor enough to get by on after bankruptcy has done its work.337 It was
not considered that the debtor would be a functional economic unit after
bankruptcy, save through the mandatory rehabilitation processes of wage
earner plans. Consequently, the property saved from distribution to credi-
tors is essentially the equivalent of a welfare stipend, designed to tide the
debtor over until the wage earner plan took hold.
This theoretical basis is consistent with the theory behind the home-
stead exemption, the life insurance exemption and other state-created ex-
emptions from execution and attachment. 338 According to section 522, a
debtor in bankruptcy should, like Dickens' paupers, be left with the clothes
on his or her back, a pile of furniture or other lumber, and a roof over his or
her head, and little else. 339 This theoretical approach to exemptions had
reached its zenith in the 1840's and has little relevance to American eco-
nomic life in the twentieth century.
Essentially, an individual debtor is a conduit for recycling the money
supply. The debtor's sources of money must be either whatever the debtor
earns as wages or salary, or whatever he can borrow. 340 By discharging the
debtor from debt and future garnishments, bankruptcy shields one primary
source of funding-earnings. As has been well documented, bankruptcy is
no bar to further forays into indebtedness by bankrupt debtors.34 1 What
individual wage-earning and salaried debtors have needed over the years is
protected from their own follies. When Congress rejected the federal bank-
ruptcy administration and mandatory debtor's workouts as proposed by the
Bankruptcy Commission, 34 2 it rejected a true reform of the bankruptcy pro-
cess for wage earners and, instead adopted a scheme which benefits only
those who have an interest in maintaining the traditional control of bank-
ruptcy process.
The current bankruptcy exemptions are intended to mesh with
336. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, Part I, at 75, 78.
337. A third allocative standard relates the goal of fair and equitable treatment with
the goal of a fresh start for the debtor. It imposes the burden of a debt on the party
better able to bear it. This determination should be made on two bases. The first is
the external social policy respecting responsibility indicated by the debt. The second
is an internal policy that looks to the ability of the creditor to pass on risk of loss. The
bankruptcy process affects different creditors to different degrees ...
[A corollary goal is the] preservation of the debtor's property necessary in his house-
hold. A uniform exemption law should set apart such property from that available
generally to creditors. The debtor should be able to retain, in both immediate dis-
charge and payment-plan cases, essential goods that are collateral securing payment of
the purchase price.
Id Part I, at 78-80.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 57-88 (discussing these exemptions in relation to the
1898 Act).
339. See supra text accompanying notes 20-30 (discussing the origin of this notion of "Dick-
ens' paupers").
340. P. NADLER, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE ECONOMY 3-6 (3d ed. 1979). See also J.
COCHRAN, MONEY, BANKING AND THE ECONOMY table 11-19, 194 (1979).
341. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 149, at 62-65.
342. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 154, Part I. at 7-8.
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mandatory debtor work-outs and counseling conducted by a federal agency:
the objective of which is to protect debtors from themselves. Because such a
system never got off the drawing boards, the law of bankruptcy permits
debtors in failing circumstances to turn over their assets once every seven
years to the bankruptcy courts in return for discharge from their previous
credit mistakes. While such a system preserves the freedom of individuals to
obtain credit and also enshrines the right of individuals to resort to no-asset
liquidations when creditors begin to press them, it does little else for debtors.
The current exemptions are welfare payments to debtors made at the ex-
pense of unsecured, and some secured, creditors. This system of indirect wel-
fare payments in the form of homestead and other exemptions does spread
the risk of a wage-earner's economic failure over a class larger than the wage
earner and his dependents, but it also theoretically spreads the loss of no-
asset cases much further. Because creditors accrue bad debt reserves based
on the frequency of bankruptcies among debtors, as well as other economic
failures causing losses, the cost of the present system is directly allocated to
all persons borrowing money from any creditor. Since 1980, that cost has
been increasing at great rates, due to the pressure of hard times and an ac-
cessible bankruptcy process.
34 3
Exemptions based on the economic and moral theories of 1840, will not
meet the problems of contemporary economic failure. The bankruptcy sys-
tem can, and should provide a cure for debtors in failing circumstances. The
constitutional infirmities of "opting out" statutes designed to placate those
whose vision cannot go beyond the antiquated laws of their state, should
demonstrate the fallacy of leaving it to the states to deal with exemptions as
social policy. The serious problems caused by lien avoidance, and the un-
duly complicated and conflicting management problems produced by the
categorical exemption system, a relic of the nineteenth century's approach to
exemption, makes a new direction in bankruptcy exemptions necessary.
B. A New Direction in Exemptions
Bankruptcy exemptions should be considered as a means of restoring
debtors to functional economic units with income and capital. The tradi-
tional exemption policies give only indirect welfare payments. The bank-
ruptcy exemptions should be an incentive to wage-earning debtors with a
proven bad track record as installment credit buyers and borrowers to pro-
tect themselves from disaster. If that would be the goal of the exemption
process, then what the debtor needs is a flexible cash allowance out of his
assets, which, like the ancient English acts,344 gives a premium to debtors
who made some substantial effort to give their unsecured creditors a divi-
dend. Under our scheme of things, this means an exemption system encour-
aging debtors to file bankruptcy plans with serious thought to repayment in
mind. The debtor's preservation as an economic unit is the goal, and to
343. According to the U.S. Administrative Office of the Courts, 331,088 personal bank-
ruptcy petitions were filed in 1980, 363,847 petitions in 1981, counting joint petitions filed by
husband and wife as one filing.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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achieve this goal the exemption system should provide for aggregation of the
debtor's assets in liquid form for investment purposes. Many consumer-
debtors have not developed a habit of thrift and have not accumulated a
cash reserve. Thus, rehabilitation for them would be a program of court-
supervised thrift.
Debtors should be shielded by an exemption that provides for some im-
mediate welfare substitute and for a long-term accumulation of capital. To
design such a program, Congress would have to reject the preference it has
shown for states' rights and pleasing everyone with every aspect of exemp-
tions. The most feasible program design for such a rehabilitation program
would be an exemption trust fund, which would allow debtors to place liqui-
dated cash exemptions in trust, supervised by a bankruptcy court. The pur-
pose of the exemption trust fund would be to rehabilitate debtors as
economic units, and to encourage debtors to take viable work-out programs,
in lieu of no-asset straight bankruptcies.
Administratively, the trust fund would be administered by a special
trustee under the supervision of the bankruptcy judge. The trust fund would
pay compensation to the trustee out of earnings. Because trust account prac-
tices would require annual reports to the court and investments in a prudent
manner, having regard for the principal as well as earnings, the trust fund
would be restricted to the purchase of United States Government securities.
Congress could in fact authorize the Treasury Department to issue special
obligations that would retire the principal of the national debt, paying a
fixed non-taxable rate for sale only to the nation's Exemption Trust Funds.
The funds held in trust should be free from taxation in the hands of the
trustees and free from taxation in the debtor's hands as dividends.
The assets of debtors in the Exemption Trust Fund would be free from
all claims of creditors, present and post-bankruptcy, whether dischargeable
or not dischargeable, so long as not withdrawn by the debtor. Involuntary
transfer of a debtor's interest as a result of death would not change the ex-
empt status of the fund. Assets in the fund could not be paid over to the
debtor during the year following the debtor's discharge or confirmation of
the debtor's plan. After the one year moratorium, the debtor could with-
draw up to twenty-five percent of the principal and accrued income credited
to his or her account during each of the next four years, or withdraw the
outstanding balance at the end of the fifth year. After the initial accumula-
tion period, Chapter 1 1345 and 13346 debtors could also allocate up to ten
percent of the principal and accrued income in their account for payments
to creditors under their plan. Provisions for future payments from the trust
fund accounts could, therefore, be included as part of the order confirming
the plan in chapter 11 and 13 rehabilitation proceedings.
To encourage debtors to make use of the trust fund for their own bene-
fit, chapter 11 and 13 debtors would be permitted to deposit post-bank-
ruptcy earnings in their fund account for up to five years after confirmation.
345. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (Reorganization Chapter).




Thus, a confirmation order could require that a certain percent of post-peti-
tion earnings be deposited in the Exemption Trust Fund. Upon conversion
of a chapter 11 or 13 case to a chapter 7347 case, the funds deposited in the
Exemption Trust Fund could continue as exempt. Post-conversion deposits
or withdrawals by debtors from the fund would not be part of the dividend
to creditors.
Mechanically, exemptions for chapter 7 debtors would be simple. A
chapter 7 debtor would be entitled to exempt $10,000 in fair market value of
his assets reported on the schedules of his petition for bankruptcy, to the
extent that such assets are unencumbered by enforceable security interests or
liens. This would be the welfare exemption. No categorical limitations
would be placed on the debtor's choice. In addition to the $10,000 exemp-
tion, equities in encumbered assets could be elected. These equities could be
taken as cash allowances by the debtor, as well as a "set-off' of the encum-
bered exempt property to the debtor by the bankruptcy court. These ex-
emptions would be subject to the claims of non-dischargeable debt-holding
creditors.
If the debtor's estate was an asset estate, as opposed to the typical no-
asset case, then the debtor would be allowed an additional exemption of a
fixed percent of the estate as defined by section 541 in the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act. 348 Section 541 would be redefined to make the beneficial inter-
est of spendthirft trust funds34 9 and the debtor's interest in entireties prop-
erty assets of the estate.
350
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 debtors filing petitions for rehabilitation
would be able to claim the same welfare exemption as chapter 7 debtors. In
addition, each would be given, as part of the confirmation order and plan,
the opportunity to contribute a portion of post-petition funds to the Exemp-
tion Trust Fund as part of the plan. If the debtor's work-out produced a
dividend of ten to thirty percent to creditors, the debtor would receive an
additional exemption of four percent of the net dividend. If the debtor pro-
duced thirty-one to fifty percent dividends to creditors, then the debtor
would be entitled to take an exemption of eight percent of the dividend
amount. A dividend of fifty-one to seventy-five percent would merit a
twelve percent exemption payment, and a dividend of seventy-six to one
hundred percent would provide an exemption payment of fifteen percent of
the net payment to creditors, taken from the assets of the debtor used to
meet the plan. This final exemption would be payable at discharge time,
and would be a bonus to the debtor who made a good faith effort to pay his
obligations through a court-supervised work-out program.
There are three main objections to a trust fund of this type and exemp-
tions geared to making debtors viable after bankruptcy: 1) such an enforced
347. It U.S.C. § 701 (Liquidation Chapter).
348. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (estate includes all property that a debtor has legal or equitable inter-
est in, including community property, proceeds, bequests, and others).
349. Se supra text accompanying notes 88-90 (history of the treatment of spendthrift trusts
in bankruptcy).




savings mechanism has never been a part of the bankruptcy law before, and
may not be permissible under the Constitution, 2) it makes no allowance for
state created exemptions which are more, or less, generous to debtors than
this program, and 3) the freedom of the debtor is abridged. The answer to
the first objection is the standing trustee for chapter 13 cases is, in form,
similar to this system and has not been challenged as an unconstitutional
measure.351 The second objection is granted. No preference is given state
exemptions because they serve no federal purpose, unless favoritism of spe-
cial interest groups is a legitimate federal purpose. The third objection is
also granted. Debtors are not free to commit financial suicide after
bankruptcy.
Were the trust fund adopted as the federal bankruptcy scheme, all the
constitutional challenges to the crazy quilt exemption pattern of section 522
would be terminated. The "opt-out" statute with its importation of made by
state bankruptcy laws into the federal bankruptcy courts would be elimi-
nated. The unworkable administration of the categorical exemptions in
bankruptcy would not have to be dealt with each day. An incentive to wage
earning and salaried debtors to pay substantial portions of their debts would
be provided. This would, of course, be at the expense of the debtor's free-
dom to commit financial suicide via chapter 7. It would also provide a
means to retire a portion of the national debt and encourage thrift as a part
of the chapter 11 and 13 plans.
351. See II U.S.C. § 1302, § 1326 (defining the duties of a standing trustee and the percent-
age fee for the trustee).
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